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THE NEW WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 
Ian Samuel* 
 
The providers of network services (and the makers of network devices) 
know an enormous amount about our lives.  Because they do, these network 
intermediaries are being asked with increasing frequency to assist the 
government in solving crimes or gathering intelligence.  Given how much 
they know about us, if the government can secure the assistance of these 
intermediaries, it will enjoy a huge increase in its theoretical capacity for 
surveillance—the ability to learn almost anything about anyone.  This has 
the potential to create serious social harm, even assuming that the 
government continues to adhere to ordinary democratic norms and the rule 
of law. 
One possible solution to this problem is for network intermediaries to 
refuse government requests for aid and attempt to sustain those refusals in 
court.  Although this proposal has received an enormous amount of attention, 
there is substantial cause for skepticism about how well it can work.  
Congress has given the government wide authority to demand information 
and assistance through tools like subpoenas, the Stored Communications Act, 
and Title III.  Even when the government does not have specific statutory 
authorization, courts have interpreted the All Writs Act to authorize a great 
deal of open-ended aid, consistent with the well-settled Anglo-American 
history of third-party assistance in law enforcement.  It is also far from 
unheard of for the executive to read restrictions on its surveillance authority 
narrowly, and its own inherent powers broadly, to engage in surveillance 
that is quasi- or extra-legal. 
A superior (or at least complementary) response to the problem is to 
restrict network intermediaries themselves by limiting how much they can 
learn about us and how long they can retain it.  This approach treats 
enhanced state surveillance as a problem created by the intermediaries’ 
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stockpiling of data, and proposes to solve it at the root—which would, as a 
useful side effect, solve a number of other problems created by that 
stockpiling, too. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is better than real memory, because real memory, at the cost of much 
effort, learns to remember but not to forget.1 
In November 2015, a man died at the home of James Bates, in Bentonville, 
Arkansas, in what was alleged to be a murder.2  As part of the investigation, 
the police searched Bates’s home and discovered an Amazon Echo3—a 
voice-activated personal assistant that is always listening for users’ 
commands.4  The police wondered whether that microphone recorded 
 
 1. UMBERTO ECO, FOUCAULT’S PENDULUM 25 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace 
& Co. 1989). 
 2. Amye Buckley, Bentonville 34-Year-Old Charged in Hot Tub Death, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Feb. 29, 2016, 5:45 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2016/ 
feb/29/bentonville-34-year-old-charged-hot-tub-death/ [https://perma.cc/Y22F-NULS]. 
 3. Amy B. Wang, Can Alexa Help Solve a Murder Case?  Police Think So, but Amazon 
Won’t Give Up the Data, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-amazon-alexa-police-20161228-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LM4K-MX5T]. 
 4. Id. (noting that the Echo is “equipped with seven microphones and responds to a ‘wake 
word,’” and that when the device “detects the wake word, it begins streaming audio to the 
cloud, including a fraction of a second of audio before the wake word”).  The Echo is 
essentially a “voice-controlled household computer,” which can do things like play music, 
order things from Amazon, and read the news. Farhad Manjoo, The Echo from Amazon Brims 
with Groundbreaking Promise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
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anything of interest on the night of the murder.5  The Bentonville police got 
a warrant directed to Amazon, seeking any recordings or transcripts that 
Amazon had from Bates’s Echo during the critical hours of the murder.6  
Amazon resisted,7 but on the eve of a hearing on a motion to quash the 
warrant, Bates consented to Amazon turning over whatever data it had from 
his Echo, and the company promptly did so.8  Though a legal showdown was 
averted, the curious case of the Bentonville Echo nonetheless lingered in the 
public and legal imagination. 
With increasing frequency, the makers of networked devices and the 
providers of network services are being asked to provide interesting sorts of 
assistance to the government.  Retroactively listening in on an alleged murder 
scene is just the start.  The government has asked network service providers 
to help them listen in on or control people’s cars, for example.9  The police 
 
2016/03/10/technology/the-echo-from-amazon-brims-with-groundbreaking-promise.html 
[https://perma.cc/A6QF-EWWP]. 
 5. Wang, supra note 3. 
 6. Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant 
Exhibit A-1, at 1–2, Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2017) 
(Extension for Search Warrant).  The attached affidavit notes that the police had searched 
Bates’s house specifically to find “electronic devices capable of storing and transmitting any 
form of data that could be related to this investigation.” Id. Exhibit A-1, at 5 (Affidavit for 
Search Warrant). 
 7. Tom Dotan & Reed Albergotti, Amazon Echo and the Hot Tub Murder, INFORMATION 
(Dec. 27, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/amazon-echo-and-the-hot-tub-
murder [https://perma.cc/SQJ8-SXX2].  The story was widely reported in many outlets, 
disappointingly few of which could resist variations on the same droll headline. See, e.g., Sean 
Gallagher, Police Ask:  “Alexa, Did You Witness a Murder?,” ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 28, 2016, 
3:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/12/police-ask-alexa-did-you-witness-a-
murder [https://perma.cc/6DQ3-LTT6]; Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You 
Help with This Murder Case?, CNN (Dec. 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/12/28/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5AC-BKET]; Elizabeth Weise, Police Ask Alexa:  Who Dunnit?, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 29, 2016, 8:13 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/ 
12/27/amazon-alexa-echo-murder-case-bentonville-hot-tub-james-andrew-bates/95879532/ 
[https://perma.cc/567S-5BEQ]. 
 8. Tracy Neal, Amazon Will Turn Over Any Data Recorded in Arkansas Man’s Hot-Tub 
Death, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:41 AM), 
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/mar/07/amazon-will-turn-over-any-data-
recorded/ [https://perma.cc/SB6V-ZD52].  Bates consented, according to his attorneys, 
because he was “innocent of all charges.” Amy Wang, Can Amazon Echo Help Solve a 
Murder?  Police Will Soon Find Out., WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/09/can-amazon-echo-help-
solve-a-murder-police-will-soon-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/44L8-9TVS].  Another reason 
could have been that because the Echo does not stream anything to Amazon “without the wake 
word being detected,” Bates thought it unlikely that the device had captured anything of 
interest. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Marla Carter, VIDEO:  12-Year-Old Leads Police on High-Speed Chase, 
ABC13 (July 1, 2016), http://abc13.com/news/video-12-year-old-leads-police-on-high-speed-
chase/1409974/ [https://perma.cc/C95A-67HD].  The driver of the car was a twelve-year-old 
girl, who apparently reached speeds of almost 120 miles per hour during a chase, at points 
squeezing narrowly between cars and into oncoming traffic at rush hour. Id. 
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routinely ask cell phone providers to help track their customers’ location.10  
The digital forensic chief of London’s Metropolitan Police has openly 
dreamed of a world where the police can get help from the makers of 
network-connected doorbells to see “who has rung the door,” or even from 
companies selling network-connected, camera-equipped refrigerators, to 
disprove claimed alibis.11  (Who did eat those plums in the icebox, anyway?)  
The government has begun to discover how useful network-attached devices 
can be, if only the assistance of network service providers can be procured.  
Gradually at first, and lately much faster, those companies have begun to 
receive demands that they provide such assistance.  These demands take 
various forms:  from routine legal tools like subpoenas and search warrants, 
to the far more exotic commands possible under the open-ended All Writs 
Act.  For want of an existing umbrella term, this Article refers to them 
collectively as “the new writs of assistance.”  Given the ubiquity of network-
connected devices, and how much they can learn about our lives, these 
commands of aid provide the state with potential access to more information 
than has ever been available before. 
This Article argues that the government’s use of the new writs of assistance 
can provide it with nearly unlimited knowledge about our lives, and that this 
is a serious problem.12  This Article also argues that direct resistance to these 
orders by the intermediaries is unlikely to mitigate this problem, and that it 
is dangerous for these intermediaries to behave as if the government can be 
reliably prohibited from using private surveillance infrastructure for its own 
ends.  Therefore, this Article proposes that we should plan for the possibility 
that the government will probably be able to learn anything about us that a 
network service provider knows, and we should impose limits on what they 
can learn about us and how long they may retain that knowledge. 
The basic forces at work have been recognized for some time.  Indeed, 
there is a vast literature about the private surveillance apparatus.13  This 
 
 10. See generally Ian Samuel, Note, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1324 (2008) (discussing the now-common practice by police of tracking suspects through their 
cell phones). 
 11. Sarah Knapton, Fridges and Washing Machines Could Be Vital Witnesses in Murder 
Plots, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 2, 2017, 9:04 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/ 
01/02/fridges-washing-machines-could-vital-witnesses-murder-plots/ [https://perma.cc/JE24-
QUM9].  “The crime scene of tomorrow,” said the official, “is going to be the internet of 
things.” Id. 
 12. The information that network intermediaries have would make it extremely easy, for 
example, to construct a database of every Muslim in the United States—including the precise 
location of every such person in real time. 
 13. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED:  POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 234–38 
(2017); BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH:  THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR 
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 47–49 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace 
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246 (1998); Alex Kozinski & Eric Nguyen, Has 
Technology Killed the Fourth Amendment?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 16–19; Alan Z. 
Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 112–22 (2018); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1999); 
Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 152–
55 (2005). 
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Article aims to add two things to this literature.  The first is a descriptive 
account of just how likely it is that the government will gain use of this 
apparatus.  Here, this Article aims to illustrate just how strong the 
government’s hand is and how historically normal it would be for network 
intermediaries to be pressed into government assistance.  The second is a 
related normative claim about why direct regulation of network service 
providers is an attractive alternative solution to this problem. 
Part I describes the basic problem.  It is now possible to gather, transmit, 
store, and analyze massive amounts of information about the day-to-day lives 
of private people, and private businesses have rapidly emerged to collect and 
monetize that private information.  The government has gotten interested in 
that data, which will soon leave us in a world where the state knows far more 
about us than was previously possible.  Part II argues that the standard 
response to this problem—ex post resistance to requests for aid by network 
intermediaries—is unlikely to work.  Finally, Part III proposes that the 
collection and disposal of personal information be regulated on the front end 
to account for the possibility that the government may be able to learn 
anything about us that network intermediaries know. 
I.  AN ACCIDENTAL PANOPTICON 
This Part describes the basic problem we are now facing.  It is now 
technically feasible to collect a massive amount of information about the day-
to-day lives of ordinary people, far more than has ever been available before.  
In response, private businesses have begun to gather and monetize that 
information in enormous quantities.  But the government has gotten 
interested in this trove of user data for its own purposes—a prospect that this 
Part argues is very dangerous. 
A.  Material and Commercial Origins 
of the Private Surveillance State 
Rapid advances in a group of technologies have made it possible to collect 
enormous amounts of personal information about a large number of people.14  
In 1965, Gordon Moore—an electronic engineer and founder of a 
semiconductor company—observed that the cost curve of integrated circuits 
was improving exponentially, enabling the computing power of such circuits 
to roughly double each year.15  Moore predicted that this would continue, 
 
 14. I begin with a material story because I regard the legal and policy issues that this 
Article addresses as in large part “superstructural, dependent for their form and content upon 
determining forces emanating from the economic basis of society.” HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM 
AND LAW 22 (1982).  There is a robust and interesting debate about the extent to which this 
can be said to be true for all legal questions, and if so, what the implications are. See, e.g., 
Mark V. Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 281, 281 (1983) (reviewing 
COLLINS, supra). 
 15. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 
ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114–17.  Specifically, Moore observed that the cost-effective 
number of components on each circuit had been roughly doubling each year, and he expected 
that to go on for at least another decade. Id. at 115.  Integrated circuits are “arrays of transistors 
and other components built from a single chip of semiconductor material,” as opposed to being 
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leading to such wonders as home computers and even “personal portable 
communications equipment.”16  This prediction turned out to be right, and 
the cost of components on integrated circuits has fallen by “roughly a factor 
of a billion over the last 50 years.”17  Meanwhile, the costs of storing, 
collecting, and transmitting information decreased,18 as our ability to do 
those things, as well as our ability to collect and transmit information (using 
inexpensive microphones, cameras, and the like) soared.19  For example, the 
number of hosts connected to the internet and the price performance of 
wireless networking were experiencing similar exponential growth during 
that period.20  The overall rate of change in these systems has been 
exponential and accelerating.21 
It has therefore become possible, in a very short amount of time, to build 
and sell cheap, powerful, small computers that collect, transmit, and store 
vast amounts of information about the world and individuals.22  Mobile 
 
“circuits constructed from discrete transistors.” PAUL HOROWITZ & WINFIELD HILL, THE ART 
OF ELECTRONICS 61 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). 
 16. Moore, supra note 15, at 114.  Even an “electronic wristwatch” would be feasible, 
Moore thought, at least as soon as a suitable display could be invented. Id.  Moore saw the 
biggest potential, however, in the “production of large systems,” such as digital filters for 
telephone communications. Id. 
 17. Rachel Courtland, How Much Did Early Transistors Cost?, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 16, 
2015, 6:30 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/semiconductors/devices/how-much-did-
early-transistors-cost [https://perma.cc/SA7B-XTWZ]. 
 18. See Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost, MKOMO.COM (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte [https://perma.cc/7BMV-T5ZF].  In December 
1981, a nineteen-megabyte Winchester hard disk cost $5495. Computer Specialties 
Advertisement, CREATIVE COMPUTING, Dec. 1981, at 233.  By July 2009, it was possible to 
purchase a one-terabyte hard drive (one million megabytes) for $74.99—a cost of seven cents 
per gigabyte, around four million times cheaper than twenty-eight years prior. Komorowski, 
supra; see also Computer Specialties Advertisement, supra. 
 19. See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Internet of Things Connectivity Binge:  What 
Are the Implications?, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/06/06/ 
the-internet-of-things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the-implications/ [https://perma.cc/X86C-
9EGB].  
 20. See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING 
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns 
[https://perma.cc/FHX2-7M8N]. 
 21. Id.; see also RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES 30–32 (1999).  Certain 
of the conclusions that Kurzweil draws from this are controversial, to say the least. See, e.g., 
Alex Beam, That Singularity Sensation, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 24, 2005), 
http://archive.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2005/02/24/that_singularity_sensation/ 
[https://perma.cc/CM96-G4QF] (noting Kurzweil’s receipt of “hooting skepticism” for certain 
of his forward-looking claims).  Luckily, one need not sign on to (for example) Kurzweil’s 
prediction of a technological “singularity,” in which human consciousness will merge with 
machine intelligence, to make use of his descriptive data about the rate of historical change to 
this point. 
 22. One estimate, published in 2011, of the world’s technological capacity to “store, 
communicate, and compute information” suggested that over the previous several decades, 
our per-capita capacity to compute information had doubled every fourteen months, our 
capacity to transmit information had doubled every thirty-four months, and our capacity to 
store information had doubled every forty months. Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The 
World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 
SCIENCE 60, 63–64 (2011).  To put this in perspective, this means that every year, humans can 
“carry out roughly 60% of the computations that could have possibly been executed by all 
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phones, for example, are in constant radio contact with cell towers, 
generating information about where we are—and where we are likely to go 
next.23  The entire nature of computers is to generate information about the 
world they can sense and what they are doing with the data they work on.24  
It is now routine to carry around a mobile phone with multiple cameras, 
microphones, and other sensors, which are all attached to a high-speed, 
always-on network connection.25 
Rich business opportunities have been created by this new ability to collect 
and process information about private people—and firms have leapt to seize 
those opportunities.  The term that is generally used to describe this field of 
burgeoning opportunities is “surveillance capitalism.”26  Behavioral 
advertising (gathering information about people to more precisely target 
them with sales pitches) is an enormous business, and it provides the 
principal revenue for modern juggernauts like Google.27  Search engine 
providers “know if you looked into breast cancer symptoms, sought marriage 
counseling, worried whether your kid was autistic, or wondered how to treat 
your hemorrhoids,” and your cell phone provider “knows where you’ve 
been” and “where you are right at this moment.”28  DVRs know whether you 
watch CNN or Fox News.29  Sometimes this information gathering is done 
 
existing general-purpose computers before that year.” Id. at 64.  Hilbert and López have, much 
like Moore did, charts illustrating this growth on a logarithmic scale—all quite steady looking. 
See id. at 62 figs.4–5; see also Moore, supra note 15, at 115–16. 
 23. See SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 1–4.  As Schneier observes, the “accumulated data 
can probably paint a better picture of how you spend your time than you can, because it doesn’t 
have to rely on human memory,” and indeed, “researchers were able to use this data to predict 
where people would be 24 hours later, to within 20 meters.” Id. at 2; see also Manlio De 
Domenico et al., Interdependence and Predictability of Human Mobility and Social 
Interactions, 9 PERVASIVE & MOBILE COMPUTING 798, 798 (2013). 
 24. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 13 (arguing that it is the nature of computers to “constantly 
produce data” as a “by-product of everything they do”).  Schneier notes, “Connect to the 
Internet, and the data you produce multiplies:  records of websites you visit, ads you click on, 
words you type.” Id. 
 25. See Brian Klug, Some Thoughts About the iPhone 5S Camera Improvements, 
ANANDTECH (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:19 AM), http://www.anandtech.com/show/7329/some-
thoughts-about-the-iphone-5s-camera-improvements [https://perma.cc/QH6G-TBY5] 
(discussing the ever-increasing quality of Apple’s iPhone cameras). 
 26. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other:  Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an 
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015).  Zuboff argues that “big data” is “the 
foundational component in a deeply intentional and highly consequential new logic of 
accumulation,” which “aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce 
revenue and market control.” Id. 
 27. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938 
(2013) (citing DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 260–66 (2010); STEVEN LEVY, IN 
THE PLEX 262–63, 336–37 (2011); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING 
26–30 (2011)).  
 28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 237 (“In theory it may be possible to go off the grid and 
avoid opening yourself up to any scrutiny—the Unabomber pulled it off for a while—but for 
most of us it is impossible to live that way.”); see also Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 13, at 
16 (discussing how very little can remain private in today’s world and how people must 
become aware of the privacy implications of their activities). 
 29. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 109 
(2008). 
2880 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
to make our lives more convenient.30  Sometimes it is done as a sort of price 
subsidy:  in order to offer a product for free, a network service provider will 
gather data on its users and then monetize that data.  As Bruce Schneier puts 
it, “Surveillance is the business model of the Internet [because] people like 
free, and people like convenient.”31 
Consequently, in a relatively short order, we have come to live our lives 
online, and in the constant presence of network-attached devices, which 
operate according to rules written by their manufacturers to enhance the 
profit they can derive from observing us.32  By itself, this situation presents 
a legitimate cause for societal concern.33  But it is even more concerning 
when the government comes to use the private surveillance system for itself. 
B.  Leviathan Online 
Unsurprisingly, the government has become interested in using this new 
trove of data for its own reasons.  Location data is incredibly useful in crime 
solving because it can establish precisely where a certain person was, and 
when.34  But to do this, the government needs the help of the network service 
providers—help that the providers are not always eager to give.  So the 
government frequently resorts to court orders to obtain this data.  These 
orders can command either the production of information that network 
intermediaries already have, the collection of information that they do not yet 
have, and could, in a technical sense, command the construction of new 
surveillance capabilities for existing devices. 
The most basic way the government can use network service 
intermediaries to learn about us is by asking them for the information they 
already have.  This Article refers to these, generically, “orders of 
production.”  In federal court, both the civil and criminal rules provide broad 
subpoena authority for investigators.35  Many administrative agencies and 
 
 30. Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 13, at 15, 23. 
 31. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 49. 
 32. Henry Farrell, The Tech Intellectuals, DEMOCRACY, Fall 2013, at 51, 56 (“Much of 
our life is conducted online, which is another way of saying that much of our life is conducted 
under rules set by large private businesses, which are subject neither to much regulation nor 
much real market competition.”). 
 33. See id. at 56–57 (“Facebook users may not like the ways in which Facebook uses their 
personal information, but their only real choices are to put up with it or to cut themselves off 
from a large part of their social life.”). 
 34. Samuel, supra note 10, at 1324–25 (“Tracking a suspect’s precise movements may 
shatter a claimed alibi:  In Scott Peterson’s murder trial, for example, Peterson’s cell phone 
records were introduced to establish his whereabouts on the morning of his wife’s murder, 
belying his version of the events of that morning.”); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 
F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016) (detailing how the government used location data to create “maps 
showing that [the defendants’] phones were within a half-mile to two miles of the location of 
each of the robberies around the time the robberies happened”), argued, No. 16-402 (U.S. 
Nov. 29, 2017). 
 35. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2) (providing for a subpoena to be quashed or 
modified when “compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3) 
(providing that a subpoena may be quashed when, among other things, compliance would 
impose an “undue burden”). 
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law enforcement entities have subpoena authority of their own.36  Many 
federal statutes authorize the government to demand ex parte that network 
service providers hand over information about their customers and records of 
their customers’ activities.37  Using subpoenas to obtain personal information 
in this way has been routine for at least a decade.38  Specialized warrants and 
other statutory procedures also contemplate network service providers giving 
over information that they already have. 
Even if a network service provider does not already have the information 
the government needs, the government may attempt to secure an order 
requiring the provider to collect and transfer that information.  This Article 
calls this sort of order an “order of collection.”  That is, the government may 
seek an order requiring the network service provider to use the devices a 
consumer already has, or the network infrastructure it has built, to gather 
information for the government.  For example, in the course of a Las Vegas 
corruption investigation,39 the government wanted to listen in on 
conversations taking place in a particular car.40  The owner had an OnStar-
like system in the car, of the sort that assists drivers in “activities from the 
mundane—such as navigating an unfamiliar neighborhood or finding a 
nearby Chinese restaurant—to the more vital—such as responding to 
emergencies or obtaining road-side assistance.”41  The government wanted 
to turn the system’s in-car microphone on and listen.42  Such requests have 
become fairly routine.43 
 
 36. Several federal statutes authorize “federal intelligence investigators (generally the 
FBI) to request that communications providers, financial institutions and credit bureaus 
provide certain types of customer business records, including subscriber and transactional 
information related to Internet and telephone usage, credit reports, and financial records.” 
BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33332, USA PATRIOT 
IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 (H.R. 3199):  A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONFERENCE BILL 10 (2006).  These “national security letters,” as these pseudosubpoenas are 
called, do not require judicial approval, and are subject to nondisclosure provisions that in 
certain circumstances forbid the recipient from revealing that they have received such a 
request. Id. at 10–12. 
 37. Id. at 10. 
 38. See Slobogin, supra note 13, at 140 (“[F]acilitated by the computerization of 
information and communication, government routinely obtains personal medical, financial[,] 
and email records, in connection with investigations that have nothing to do with business or 
governmental corruption.”). 
 39. Brief for United States at 3, In re Emergency Application for an Order Compelling 
ATX Technologies, Inc. to Show Cause, No. 2:01-cv-01495 (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 2001), ECF 
No. 1. 
 40. Id. at 1 (noting that the district court entered an order authorizing “roving 
interceptions” in a car). 
 41. Co. v. United States (In re Application of the U.S. States for an Order Authorizing the 
Roving Interception of Oral Commc’ns), 349 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 42. See id. at 1146.  The government lost in that case, although on technical grounds. See 
id. (“Because, given the set-up of the System, the surveillance could not be completed with ‘a 
minimum of interference,’ the district court erred in ordering the Company’s assistance.”). 
 43. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 2008 Ohio 2863, ¶ 2 (Ct. App. 2008) (“While monitoring 
the vehicle, the OnStar employee overheard the occupants of the vehicle discussing a possible 
illegal drug transaction.  The employee permitted the Sheriff’s dispatcher to listen to the 
conversation.”); Motion to Suppress at 1, United States v. Dantzler, No. 3:10-cr-00024 (W.D. 
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Finally, there are yet-more exotic scenarios, where the government obtains 
an order for the network service provider to build something new or enable 
the collection or production of information that the government wants.  This 
Article calls these “orders of construction.”  For example, in February 2016, 
the FBI recovered an iPhone that had belonged to Syed Farook, the object of 
a high-profile terrorism investigation.44  The phone had security features 
designed to stop anyone other than its owner from easily accessing its 
contents.45  The FBI asked Apple to develop a new version of the operating 
system without those security features, which the FBI could then install on 
Farook’s seized phone to access its contents.46 
As the above taxonomy indicates, my principal focus in this Article is 
ordinary law enforcement, of the kind conducted through court orders and 
normal legal process.  But the same dynamics are at work with intelligence 
gathering, as well as what Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have 
called the “new policing.”47  This policing refers to police activity that is 
“proactive and programmatic, rather than reactive and investigative,” and it 
is characterized by universal public surveillance, routine use of 
administrative searches, checkpoints, and other forms of investigation not 
designed to unearth evidence of any particular crime.48  Both intelligence 
gathering and the “new policing” are similar in that they are not founded on 
court orders or individualized suspicion.49  That, if anything, deepens the 
problem. 
Although each of these types of assistance orders is different in important 
ways, all share a familial relationship50 in that they all involve network 
 
La. Mar. 31, 2010), ECF No. 17-2 (arguing that law enforcement “effectively ordered OnStar 
to assist law enforcement with locating the car Mr. Dantzler was supposed to be driving”). 
 44. See Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to 
San Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/RCB8-L32R].  The 
investigation concerned the December 2, 2015, shooting in San Bernardino, California, which 
killed fourteen people and injured another twenty-two. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  Specifically, the FBI wanted Apple to develop a version of the operating system 
iOS that would permit the FBI to “submit passcodes” to the phone without any “delay between 
passcode attempts,” and which would not include the standard “auto-erase function” that wipes 
the phone after a certain number of unsuccessful passcode attempts. In re Search of an Apple 
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-
0451M, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).  Put differently, the FBI wanted to be able to 
guess the passcode by brute force, quickly trying every possible passcode with no undesirable 
side effects. 
 47. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1827, 1871 (2015). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1871–72 (noting that as the “mission of many law enforcement officials has 
grown or shifted to include intelligence gathering,” the result has been “panvasive dragnets” 
that “by their very nature intrude upon the privacy and security of large swaths of the law-
abiding public”). 
 50. I mean this in the sense used by Ludwig Wittgenstein. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65–66 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Oxford 
3d ed. 1968) (1958) (arguing that even things that do not all share a single common 
characteristic may be “related to one another in many different ways,” describing the 
classification of board games, Olympic games, and gaming with dice as “games” as an 
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service providers aiding the government.  Thus, this Article refers to them 
collectively as the “new writs of assistance.”  The writ of assistance used to 
be a very common method of law enforcement during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.51  The example known best to Americans is the customs 
writ of assistance—a “document that in the name of the king ordered a wide 
variety of persons to help the customs man make his search.”52  The customs 
writ of assistance fell into disrepute and contributed to the coming of the 
American Revolution because it was generally issued without particularized 
suspicion.53  But that is not necessarily the feature of the writ of assistance 
intended to be invoked with its name here.  Some of the new writs of 
assistance can be issued on very little suspicion, though others require a high 
showing.54  Rather, the conceptual similarity is that they require a third party 
to help—to assist—with some aspect of otherwise-authorized law 
enforcement. 
C.  A State That Could See Us as God Does 
If private network service providers are gathering unprecedented amounts 
of information about us, and the government is interested in that information, 
the next question is, is that a problem?  Is it a problem for the government to 
be theoretically able to learn nearly anything about us? 
Some government officials believe that it is not a problem at all.  In fact, 
some believe that the major looming crisis is that network service providers 
will not enable enough surveillance, thereby hindering crime solving, 
intelligence gathering, and various other worthwhile objectives.55  In 2014, 
James Comey—then the director of the FBI—gave a speech at the Brookings 
 
example); cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700–01 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “the very nature of a game [is] to have no object except amusement (that is what 
distinguishes games from productive activity)”).  In the legal literature, Daniel Solove has 
argued that privacy is best understood using this “family resemblance” idea. Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2002).  Solove also argues that “the 
quest for a common denominator or essence . . . can sometimes lead to confusion.” Id. at 1099.  
The concept has also been applied in property law, see, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of 
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 783–84 (1996), religion, see, e.g., Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 763–64 
(1984), and many other areas. 
 51. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 29–30 (1978) (stating that the writ of 
assistance was “a fairly common feature in the modes of executive rule” then common, and 
giving as examples the King’s subjects being commanded to give assistance in the 
“impressment of seamen,” the “seduction of ordinance workmen,” and many other things). 
 52. Id. at 29.  For further discussion of the customs writ of assistance, see infra notes 178–
83. 
 53. SMITH, supra note 51, at 29. 
 54. See infra Part II.A. 
 55. See, e.g., James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Going Dark:  Are Technology, Privacy, and 
Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Address Before the Brookings Institution (Oct. 16, 
2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-
safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/G8SC-9SQ8].  Comey argued that we are 
“online, in one way or another, all day long,” and our “phones and computers have become 
reflections of our personalities, our interests, and our identities.” Id.  But Comey lamented that 
the government was not “always able to access” this information, which was creating a 
“significant public safety problem.” Id. 
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Institution calling for legislative changes to solve what he called the “Going 
Dark” problem:  the failure, in his view, of the law to “keep up with changing 
technology and to maintain our ability to actually collect the 
communications” the government was interested in.56  This basic idea has 
been echoed by some in the scholarly literature.  Alan Rozenshtein, for 
example, notes that even if the widespread existence of networked devices 
enables “a net increase in government surveillance,” that surveillance may be 
nonetheless fettered by serious “constraints.”57 
These arguments, however, have generally not considered the full scope of 
what is possible to know about us with the compelled cooperation of modern 
network intermediaries.  Such intermediaries have at least theoretical access 
to everywhere we go;58 the contents of our communications;59 what we do 
and say any time we are within range of a network-attached camera or 
microphone;60 everything we purchase, at what price, and from whom; every 
website we visit, and when, along with our search history; the amount of time 
we spent on each site; what links we clicked, and what ads interested us;61 
what goes on in our homes;62 and any other information about us that can be 
 
 56. Id.  “Kids,” Comey said, have a thing called “FOMO, or ‘fear of missing out.’” Id.  
See generally Andrew Przybylski et al., Motivational, Emotional, and Behavioral Correlates 
of Fear of Missing Out, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1841 (2013) (discussing the FOMO 
phenomenon).  “With Going Dark,” said Comey (in an analogy he evidently could not be 
talked out of ahead of time): 
those of us in law enforcement and public safety have a major fear of missing out—
missing out on predators who exploit the most vulnerable among us . . . missing out 
on violent criminals who target our communities . . . missing out on a terrorist cell 
using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack. 
Comey, supra note 55 (alterations in original). 
 57. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 111.  Somewhat relatedly, Orin Kerr has called for 
“technology neutrality” in development of Fourth Amendment rules for networked 
communications, to ensure that the government’s law enforcement functions are never made 
worse off by technology—to ensure the degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment requires 
online does not exceed “the degree of privacy protection that the Fourth Amendment provides 
in the physical world.” Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  A 
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010). 
 58. This information could be inferred from your mobile phone’s location data.  It is a 
matter of debate whether such access constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” and whether 
this information can be accessed without a warrant or even any constitutional “reasonableness” 
constraints, such as probable cause. See Samuel, supra note 10, at 1339–49.  The Supreme 
Court will soon decide whether or not it can be. See Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 
(U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017). 
 59. As long as it is retained, this information is available to the government under the 
Stored Communications Act.  Under many circumstances, the government may access a 
person’s communications without notice to him or her. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 60. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 110 (“Mobile phones can be reprogrammed at a 
distance, allowing their microphones to be secretly turned on even when the phone is powered 
down.  All ambient noise and conversation can then be continuously picked up and relayed 
back to law enforcement authorities, regardless of whether the phone is being used for a call.”); 
see also United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (considering a 
case of continuous mobile-phone monitoring). 
 61. This information is gathered and routinely stored for advertising purposes. See 
SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 52–53. 
 62. There are already many network-attached home security cameras, which retain 
security footage for some time. See, e.g., Nest Aware, NEST, https://nest.com/nest-aware/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YJE-7UH7] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (offering plans that retain video 
2018] NEW WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 2885 
algorithmically inferred from the above, such as our religion, our political 
opinions, our sexual orientation, our views on Renaissance versus medieval 
art, our true opinion about our mothers, or anything else.  Essentially all of 
this is technically possible now, and it will only get easier as the technological 
and commercial forces described above63 continue their march.  There has 
never been a state in the history of human civilization with the capability to 
do these things, which, by itself, is a good reason for caution.64  But, on the 
merits, would it be a problem to have a state that could see us as God might?  
Or is it wise to “make the Leviathan all seeing so that he may protect us all 
the better”?65 
Survey evidence indicates that most people would find this world 
frightening.66  So does popular literature.67  Almost no one believes that it 
would be good to have this kind of all-encompassing record of their life, 
especially in government hands.68  The government could never have 
 
from ten to thirty days).  The “Nest IQ” is apparently powerful enough to “read the title of a 
book printed on a hardcover spine” from across the room. Darrell Etherington, Nest’s Latest 
Home Camera Is the Super Smart Nest Cam IQ, TECHCRUNCH (May 31, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/31/nests-latest-home-security-camera-is-the-super-smart-
nest-iq/ [https://perma.cc/97QP-4FAH]. 
 63. See supra Part I.A. 
 64. Cf. PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT:  IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (discussing the 
“precautionary principle”); Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with 
Application to the Genetic Modification of Organisms) 1 (Sept. 4, 2014) (unpublished working 
paper) (on file with the Extreme Risk Initiative, N.Y.U. School of Engineering) (arguing that 
if “an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to the public domain (such 
as general health or the environment),” then “the burden of proof about absence of harm falls 
on those proposing the action”). 
 65. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 10:45, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 
12-207), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/opinion_announcement_audio/22619 
[https://perma.cc/M8UA-Z2YL].  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), concerned the 
legality of taking a person’s DNA without any suspicion that it would reveal evidence of a 
crime, id. at 1965–66.  The Court approved the practice. Id.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented. Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The quotation 
about an all-seeing Leviathan does not appear in the written dissent—only the Justice’s oral 
statement from the bench—although it was widely reported at the time of the decision. See, 
e.g., Joan Biskupic, Analysis:  With Trademark Vigor, Justice Scalia Dissents in DNA Case, 
REUTERS (June 3, 2013, 3:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-scalia-
analysis/analysis-with-trademark-vigor-justice-scalia-dissents-in-dna-case-
idUSBRE95211Y20130603 [https://perma.cc/UJ7Y-CJ52]. 
 66. See, e.g., MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ 
ATTITUDES ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE 5 (2015), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-
Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZV6-WN2H].  Overwhelming majorities of 
people regard it as important to be in control of who can get information about them and to be 
able to speak confidentially about their personal lives with people they trust. Id. at 17. 
 67. At this point, it is so common for dystopian fiction to feature an omniscient 
surveillance state as to be cliché. See, e.g., CORY DOCTOROW, LITTLE BROTHER (2008); DAVE 
EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013); GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).  But the cliché 
is the point:  it is evidence of a certain kind of fear that is widely held and durable across time. 
 68. Only 28 percent of people believe that it is reasonable for the government agencies to 
maintain records or archives of their activities for “[a]s long as they need to.” MADDEN & 
RAINIE, supra note 66, at 25.  Even fewer believe that about online advertisers, search engine 
providers, or social media sites. Id. 
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achieved political consensus to install location trackers on the person of every 
citizen, even subject to a promise that the location tracking would only be 
activated with a court order.69  That alone suggests that there is a problem:  
the government should not be able to acquire a power accidentally that it 
could never have acquired on purpose.  It is one thing to build something 
dangerous and quite another to build it by accident. 
On the merits, there are many practical harms that such a large increase in 
the government’s theoretical capacity for surveillance might cause.  For one, 
a government with such an all-seeing theoretical capacity for surveillance 
would eliminate the ability of anyone to spend time certain that they were not 
being observed, and would thereby deny to everyone what Julie Cohen 
describes as the “breathing room” necessary for normal human flourishing 
and “the work of self-making.”70  Such a world would be enormously bland 
and inhibited:  our culture would become less rich as experimentation became 
more costly,71 and we would be less informed if we knew all of our interests 
might be available to the state.72  Self-censorship in a world like that would 
be inevitable, especially for behaviors or views that were unpopular or 
politically out of favor.73  And many of the positive liberties we cherish (such 
as free speech and assembly) depend on antecedent opportunities to read, 
generate hunches, speak with friends, and test out ideas, unobserved.74  This 
is all the more true for that speech the First Amendment privileges most:  
 
 69. Cf. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 47 (“Imagine that the [U.S.] government passed a law 
requiring all citizens to carry a tracking device.  Such a law would immediately be found 
unconstitutional.  Yet we carry our cell phones everywhere.”). 
 70. Cohen, supra note 13, at 1911.  Cohen argues that once citizens are subject to 
“pervasively distributed surveillance,” they are vulnerable to shaping and modulation by 
powerful commercial and political interests—which, in turn, could eliminate the conditions 
that make liberal democracy possible in the first place. Id. at 1912.  That is an example of a 
second-order effect of perfect surveillance, and there are undoubtedly many more that are 
difficult to forecast. 
 71. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:  Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) (arguing that the possibility that every “first move or false 
start” will be monitored will tend to drive people’s behavior toward the “bland and the 
mainstream”). 
 72. If you knew the government might get access to your entire Google search history one 
day, would it affect what you looked for? 
 73. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (2006) (arguing 
that pervasive surveillance “can alter the way people engage in their activities” by, for 
example, “making them less likely to attend political rallies or criticize popular views”).  
Solove’s taxonomy argues generally that “[a]bstract incantations of ‘privacy’ are not nuanced 
enough to capture the problems involved” because “privacy violations involve a variety of 
types of harmful or problematic activities.” Id. at 480–81; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 
1, 13 (1972) (discussing the concept of a chilling effect); Solove, supra note 50, at 1130. 
 74. Neil Richards has called this “intellectual privacy.” See generally NEIL RICHARDS, 
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:  RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015).  Richards 
argues that before we can speak freely, we must be able to read freely and communicate our 
nascent ideas in confidence. Id. at 11–12; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 114 (2007) (arguing that “First Amendment 
activities are implicated by a wide array of law enforcement data-gathering activities”). 
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political speech, critical of the government and of officials we might not want 
learning we had been grousing about them in frank terms.75 
These concerns are particularly severe when the party observing us is the 
government.  The government is unique in its ability to aggregate knowledge 
from many other sources, no one of which paints quite as complete a portrait 
as all of them together.76  Aggregated information can be particularly 
dangerous because we are limited in our ability to remember which bits of 
information we have given to whom, leading us to make mistakes about how 
much we have exposed ourselves to the world.77  Moreover, government 
surveillance poses unique risks because the government may exercise 
coercive force over us at any time.78  In particular, it would unacceptably 
alter the balance of power in our lives by increasing the risks to us of official 
misbehavior, both in terms of its likelihood and the harm it could do.  All of 
these harms still occur even if the government does not, in fact, monitor all 
of its citizens at all times, and they can even become more severe,79 as the 
uncertainty itself functions as a mechanism of social control.80 
These harms have been recognized for some time, but what is new for the 
purposes of this Article is the sheer scope of what technology has enabled the 
government to learn about us—and thus the magnitude of the threat we are 
facing.  For most of our history, this sort of knowledge has been impossible, 
and so our legal institutions are not designed to account for its harms.81  To 
 
 75. On the proposition that political speech is at the core of traditional First Amendment 
protections, see, for example, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) 
(holding that “speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office” is “at the core 
of our First Amendment freedoms”). 
 76. See Solove, supra note 73, at 506–11; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 5 
(“Policing is just one function of government, and yet it is special.  Policing officials are 
granted remarkable powers.  They are allowed to use force on us.”).  To the extent that this 
aggregation concern is taken seriously, it would also raise serious issues involving market 
concentration by network service providers, who could also be expected to aggregate a great 
deal of information about private people.  Antitrust law in the United States has traditionally 
not regarded such effects as relevant as they do not relate to prices, though there is a re-
emerging strain in the antitrust literature, known as “economic structuralism,” that questions 
an exclusive focus on price. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 
YALE L.J. 712, 717 (2017). 
 77. Solove, supra note 73, at 507–08.  Solove notes that “aggregated information can 
reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would be known about her when the 
original, isolated data was collected”—upsetting people’s expectations in “unanticipated 
ways,” as we all “give out bits of information in different settings,” with at least some 
expectation that “in each disclosure, [we] are revealing relatively little about [ourselves].” Id. 
 78. Cf. id. at 487–88 (noting a quintessentially “modern” kind of problem that involves 
not immediate insult or harm to a person but a greatly enhanced risk that “a person might be 
harmed in the future”). 
 79. Id. at 495 (discussing harms resulting from situations where “people are generally 
aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never sure if they are being watched at any 
particular moment”). 
 80. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (1977).  That was the essence of 
Jeremy Bentham’s proposal for a “Panopticon,” a prison designed such that any guard could 
see any prisoner at any given moment, but no prisoner could be sure whether he was or was 
not being watched. Id.  Bentham really meant it; Foucault’s account is less warm. 
 81. As Justice Alito has observed, “In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of 
privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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monitor even a single person’s movements, for example, would once have 
required vast resources in the physical world—agents, helicopters, cars, and 
binoculars, all working endlessly.82  Today it requires a single court order 
directed to a phone company.  The technical and practical constraints on 
government surveillance are gone—all that remains are legal ones. 
We need not agree at this stage on what precisely the state ought not to be 
able to learn about us.  You might be bothered by the idea of a modern-day 
“pink file,”83 documenting the sexual orientation of everyone in the 
country.84  I might be bothered by a database of people’s movements.  A third 
person might object to a government database of our website-reading habits.  
What precisely is too dangerous to give to the state is a substantive question 
that will be relevant later, but for now what matters is that we are barreling 
rapidly toward a world in which the state can learn anything about anyone.  
If that is a problem, how do we stop it? 
II.  A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF EX POST RESISTANCE 
But what is the danger?  Can’t the companies that store so much of our 
data simply refuse government requests for assistance—won’t they, surely, 
in this post-Snowden era?  Won’t they have powerful allies in courts, staffed 
by neutral, life-tenured judges skeptical of executive overreach?  And won’t 
their combined lobbying powers in Congress, at any rate, ensure that their 
valuable private-surveillance model is protected at any cost?  Alan 
Rozenshtein argues for something like this view:  that network intermediaries 
have significant practical ability to resist helping the government with law 
enforcement and surveillance.85  Rozenshtein calls these actors, in what is 
perhaps a bit of deck stacking, “surveillance intermediaries.”86  He argues 
that they are incentivized to resist state demands for aid, and, more 
importantly, that they will be effective in that resistance.87  Rozenshtein 
argues that refusing to voluntarily give up users’ information and instead 
 
 82. Id. (noting that pervasive location surveillance “would have required a large team of 
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” which would only be undertaken in 
unusual circumstances). 
 83. See Lukasz Szulc, Operation Hyacinth and Poland’s Pink Files, NOTCHES (Feb. 2, 
2016), http://notchesblog.com/2016/02/02/operation-hyacinth-and-polands-pink-files/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6X7-YNCS]. 
 84. In the 1980s, the Polish security services set out to create a database of all the gay 
people in Poland. Iwona Zielinska, Who Is Afraid of Sexual Minorities?  Homosexuals, Moral 
Panic, and the Exercise of Social Control 4 (Ctr. for Criminological Research, Sheffield Univ., 
Occasional Paper 1, 2005), https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.784!/file/Iwona 
_paper2.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9GA-2NE9].  It was called Operation Hyacinth, and it resulted 
in the creation of many bureaucratic dossiers. Szulc, supra note 83.  One leader in a Warsaw 
gay-rights organization recalls that he was arrested and interrogated, and “the investigators 
filled in a document entitled ‘The Dossier of a Homosexual.’” Id.  “Above all,” he recalls, 
“they asked for names” of other gay people in Poland, but they also asked about a great deal 
more (including “preferred types of lovers”). Id. 
 85. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 122–44. 
 86. Id.  Though, in fairness, “the new writs of assistance” is not exactly a study in 
neutrality, either. 
 87. Id. at 116. 
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insisting that the government prove some legal entitlement to it will generally 
hamper the government’s efforts in a serious way.88 
This strategy (collect the information now, resist handing it over later) was 
prominently on display during Apple’s 2016 dispute with the FBI.89  Apple 
very publicly refused to build the software that the government wanted.90  
The government sought a court order, and dozens of technology companies 
rushed to Apple’s side.91  A high-profile showdown on the extent of a 
company’s responsibility to assist the government was averted, however, 
because the government, without Apple’s help, was able to access the data 
stored on Farook’s iPhone, and so dropped its request.92  Ultimate resolution 
of the scope of third-party assistance duties was therefore forestalled, but the 
litigation strategy obviously reflected at least a reasonable assessment of its 
chances by the network companies involved. 
This Part calls for greater skepticism of the prospects for this sort of ex 
post resistance.  The government’s hand in such disputes is much stronger 
than is widely recognized.  Current law is incredibly favorable to the new 
writs of assistance, and the legislature has repeatedly demonstrated its 
willingness to change the law to ensure that the government gets the help it 
needs.  Even absent specific statutory authorization, courts—relying on our 
long history of compelled private assistance for law enforcement—generally 
require aid to the government anyway.  And even on those occasions where 
courts and legislatures have tried to keep information out of the government’s 
hands, the executive has generally been able to get what it wants anyway, by 
generously interpreting its inherent powers, reading the limits imposed on it 
narrowly, and avoiding court involvement where possible.  This “threat 
model”93 illustrates how fragile an ex post resistance strategy really is, and 
 
 88. Id. at 122–34.  Rozenshtein calls this “proceduralism and litigiousness.” Id. at 122. 
 89. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 90. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/W9BJ-AL8V].  Cook, the CEO of 
Apple, explained that iPhone users, including him, store “an incredible amount of personal 
information, from our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our calendars 
and contacts, our financial information and health data, even where we have been and where 
we are going,” and that what the FBI wanted, in Apple’s view, was for the company to build 
“something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create”:  “a 
backdoor to the iPhone.” Id. 
 91. Amicus briefs in support of Apple were filed by (among others) Facebook, Google, 
Amazon, Kickstarter, Reddit, Twitter, Dropbox, Evernote, Nest, Slack, the ACLU, AT&T, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Jesse Jackson, and (most august of all) thirty-two law 
professors. See Press Release, Apple, Amicus Briefs in Support of Apple (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple/ 
[https://perma.cc/H5T4-4C5F]. 
 92. Government’s Status Report, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. 16-cm-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 
2016). 
 93. See Kendra Albert, Computer Security Tools & Concepts for Lawyers, 20 GREEN BAG 
2D 127, 130 (2017) (“Basically, the idea behind threat modeling is that different risks require 
different protections.  The steps to prevent or mitigate a thief stealing one’s laptop to resell it 
are very different from the steps taken to prevent a litigation opponent from hacking into one’s 
email server.  Identifying one’s threats is the key towards successful security practices.”). 
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the compelling need to develop something superior to it if we are concerned 
about the problem outlined in Part I. 
A.  Legislative Accommodation of Government Aid 
This Part argues that the government today enjoys wide-ranging legislative 
authorizations to get information and assistance from third-party network 
service providers.  When courts have read those authorizations narrowly, 
legislatures have generally amended them to make clear that the government 
can get whatever help it needs. 
Legislative authorization for “orders of production”94 is already quite 
broad.  If the government wants a network service provider to give it 
information it has about a customer, all it generally has to do is ask.  The 
easiest of these tools is a subpoena.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require clerks of court to issue blank subpoenas to prosecutors, which they 
then fill out themselves;95 such subpoenas may order the production of any 
“documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.”96  Criminal 
subpoenas are judged by incredibly loose standards.  The government is often 
deemed to be entitled “to every man’s evidence,”97 and in grand jury 
proceedings, the object of a subpoena is not even permitted to argue that the 
information sought is irrelevant.98  Subpoenas need not be supported by 
probable cause,99 and they may be issued on the mere suspicion that the law 
is being violated, “or even just [to obtain] assurance that it is not.”100  There 
are only a small number of grounds for resisting a subpoena,101 none of which 
are robust enough to deal with the danger we are concerned with here.  A 
claim of privilege is usually not available to a third-party network service 
provider,102 and a claim that assembling the records is too burdensome is 
 
 94. See supra Part I.B. 
 95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a). 
 96. Id. r. 17(c)(1). 
 97. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)). 
 98. Id. (noting that the object of a grand jury subpoena is not “entitled to urge objections 
of incompetency or irrelevancy” or “‘challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury’ 
or ‘to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct’” (quoting Blair v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919))). 
 99. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, unless 
subpoenas are warrants, they are limited by the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth 
Amendment (protecting the people against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’), not by the 
probable cause requirement.”). 
 100. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950); see also United States 
v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (noting that the “function of the grand jury is to 
inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified 
an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred”); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701 (“A 
grand jury investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down 
and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.’” 
(quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970))). 
 101. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 806 
(2005) (enumerating essentially “three grounds for resisting a subpoena:  privilege, 
burdensomeness, and irrelevance” and explaining that none are typically successful). 
 102. Id. at 822–26 (noting that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections for information 
held by third parties are “virtually nonexistent”).  As Slobogin notes and as this Article argues 
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“almost always doomed to failure.”103  This low standard is generally 
justified on the ground that it would be impossible to ever generate probable 
cause for more intrusive searches and seizures (or formal charges) if 
investigators could not require the production of information from parties of 
interest.104  Even absent a grand jury, the government is authorized to issue 
administrative subpoenas directly in many contexts, which are judged by 
similarly loose standards.105  Most notoriously, Congress has authorized the 
FBI to issue so-called “national security letters,” which order the production 
of certain information if the government merely certifies it is relevant to an 
ongoing terrorism or intelligence investigation.106 
With regard to network service providers specifically, Congress has 
authorized the government to seek production of customer information under 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA).107  Enacted as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986108 and amended several times since,109 
the law authorizes the government to “require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . pursuant to a warrant,”110 and to “require a provider of 
 
above, the “historical change in this setting has not been in the law, but in the extent to which 
personal information is now housed with third parties.” Id. at 826; see also supra Part I. 
 103. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135 (2d ed. 1999); see also 
Slobogin, supra note 101, at 806. 
 104. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (“Of what use would it be for the 
legislature to declare these [acts] unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access 
to every available source of information upon the subject?”); Parks v. FDIC, 65 F.3d 207, 218 
(1st Cir. 1995) (Selya, J., dissenting) (“This incipient problem—the need to hitch the horse in 
front of the cart—is frequently exacerbated because the subpoena power has great significance 
for most administrative agencies in the conduct of important public business.”). 
 105. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 643 (noting that when “investigative and accusatory 
duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself 
as to whether there is probable violation of the law”); see United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 
48, 57–58 (1964) (noting that administrative subpoenas need only be founded on a “legitimate 
purpose”); see also Slobogin, supra note 101, at 815 (discussing the “move toward the current 
regime of virtually unlimited subpoena power”).  For an example of a statute authorizing 
administrative subpoenas, see 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2012); see also Doe v. United States, 253 
F.3d 256, 262–65 (6th Cir. 2001) (determining what is required under the statute to issue an 
administrative subpoena). 
 106. For an overview of the development of national security letters (NSLs), see Andrew 
E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1201, 1206–13 (2007).  Authority for NSLs is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709. 
 107. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).  The Act applies to “remote computing service[s],” 
defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means 
of an electronic communications system.” Id. § 2711(2). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711). 
 109. For an overview of the Act and how it has changed, see generally Orin S. Kerr, A 
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added).  The Act draws a distinction between the 
contents of a communication stored for more or less than 180 days. Id.  Some courts have held 
that this distinction cannot be squared with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 
892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 
746 (2010). 
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electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” upon a showing of 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the information is “relevant and 
material” to an ongoing investigation.111  Anything other than the contents of 
a communication, in other words, must be produced only upon a showing of 
relevance to some ongoing investigation.112 
The government can and does use its power under the SCA to force the 
disclosure of enormous amounts of sensitive information about the users of 
network services.  An example is the government’s showdown with Twitter 
over WikiLeaks.113  As part of the investigation into Chelsea Manning’s leak 
of classified information, the government requested an order under the SCA 
for information about three users, none of whom was Manning.114  The 
government wanted “account names and user IDs, all personal addresses, 
payment information, session times, and IP addresses for devices from which 
tweets were sent,”115 all of which could be “intensely revealing.”116  And in 
the end, the government won.117 
Current law is also broadly accommodating of “orders of collection.”  The 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires 
any “telecommunications carrier” to “ensure that its equipment, facilities, or 
services . . . are capable of” being used by “the government, pursuant to a 
court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept . . . all wire and 
electronic communications” transmitted by those services.118  CALEA left 
“information services” out of its scope,119 and specifically provided that a 
service provider had no responsibility for “decrypting, or ensuring the 
government’s ability to decrypt, any communication.”120  But those are 
statutory affordances that reflected a political compromise in 1994—one 
many would like to see altered today.  Rozenshtein, for example, has 
suggested that it may be necessary to “demand technological impact 
assessments before a technology company develops a product or service that 
disrupts a key government function like effective surveillance.”121  Network 
service providers of any meaningful size would likely obey such changes if 
 
 111. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d) (emphasis added). 
 112. Of course, to the extent that such production would represent a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Act could not alter relevant constitutional requirements.  In United 
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), argued, No. 16-402 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017), 
the government sought the disclosure of a subscriber’s location records, id. at 884.  The 
Supreme Court will soon decide whether or not disclosing that information constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment “search,” and if so, whether a warrant is required. See Carpenter v. United States, 
No. 16-402 (U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017). 
 113. For an in-depth discussion of this incident, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 235–38. 
 114. Id. at 236. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (quoting In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 (E.D. Va. 2011)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012). 
 119. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A). 
 120. Id. § 1002(b)(3). 
 121. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 182. 
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they were implemented.122  Federal law also permits court orders requiring 
the activation of microphones in people’s personal devices to listen in on their 
oral communications.123  And the Pen Register Act similarly requires the 
provision of “all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to 
accomplish the installation of the pen register.”124 
Legislatures, moreover, have displayed an enormous willingness to modify 
the law to ensure that the government can get the assistance it needs for 
authorized investigations.  In the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided two cases that—doctrinally—provided an enormous 
amount of protection for the users of telephones.  Decades earlier, the Court 
had held in Olmstead v. United States125 that government wiretaps were not 
“searches” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they are 
accomplished without physical intrusions into the home.126  But in Berger v. 
New York,127 the Court changed course, invalidating New York’s 
wiretapping statute on the ground that it did not require an adequate showing 
by the government before the wiretap was installed.128  And in Katz v. United 
States,129 the Court formally overruled Olmstead, concluding that 
“electronically listening to and recording [a person’s] words” constituted “a 
 
 122. By way of analogy, before the relaxation of export controls on cryptography in the 
United States, commercial software providers almost universally obeyed such controls. See 
Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
416, 433–41 (2012) (detailing the history of the “crypto wars”).  Interestingly, however, even 
during this period, free software that implemented strong encryption was “widely available on 
the Internet.” Id. at 439 & n.48 (discussing PGP—short for “Pretty Good Privacy”).  The extent 
to which pseudo-samizdat free software could again preserve a measure of privacy even in a 
world of strict design limits is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this Article. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012); see also United States v. Oliva, 686 F.3d 1106, 1110–11 
(9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2518); United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565, 
568 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (2012). 
 125. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 126. Id. at 466.  This happened, it is worth noting, over the vigorous objection of the 
telephone companies—the network intermediaries of their day—who filed a crisp eight-page 
amicus brief in support of Olmstead. See generally Brief in Support of Petitioners’ Contention, 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (Nos. 493, 532, 533).  It was the “very nature” of the telephone service 
to be private, the companies argued, and the “wire tapper destroy[ed] this privacy.” Id. at 4.  
Foreshadowing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the companies even argued that a 
wiretap must surely count as a search because it invaded a person’s home without a warrant:  
“[h]aving regard to the substance of things,” a wiretapper “would not do this more truly if he 
secreted himself in the home of the citizen.” Brief in Support of Petitioners’ Contention, supra, 
at 4–5; cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained” 
without a physical intrusion is a Fourth Amendment search). 
 127. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 128. Id. at 57–59.  Specifically, the Court objected that New York’s statute authorized the 
“indiscriminate use” of wiretaps:  it authorized wiretapping “without requiring belief that any 
particular offense has been or is being committed” and without requiring the conversations 
sought to be “particularly described,” it permitted long interceptions with indefinite 
extensions, and it provided neither notice to the target (!) nor any showing of “exigent 
circumstances” to excuse the requirement of notice. Id. at 58–60. 
 129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2894 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”130  The 
effect of Berger and Katz together was to seriously restrict, on constitutional 
grounds, the government’s ability to intercept telephone calls—an almost 
total reversal of Olmstead and a doctrinal victory for the telephone companies 
and their users. 
But legislatures responded by modifying the law to accommodate the 
constitutional concerns while still permitting the government to collect the 
information it wished to have.  The day after Berger was decided, the Speaker 
of the New York State Assembly pledged to modify New York’s wiretapping 
laws to comply with Berger and ensure that the government could continue 
to intercept calls.131  In June 1968, the state did just that, imposing new 
procedural safeguards that set a low bar (such as naming the person being 
investigated, the crime of which they were suspected, and the site at which 
the wiretapping order was to be used).132  And in June 1968—almost a year 
to the day after the Court’s decision in Berger—Congress passed Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968133 (the Wiretap 
Act), which created a warrant system for wiretapping to comply with both 
Katz and Berger and to ensure the government could still collect the 
information it wished.134 
When court decisions limiting government access to information are based 
on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional interpretation, a 
legislature can swiftly act to change the law on which the decision is based, 
as the events after Title III’s enactment illustrate.  Title III gave the 
government the authority to eavesdrop on telephone conversations, at least 
upon an appropriate showing.  But what if it needed help from the phone 
companies to do it?  In 1970, the FBI sought an order authorizing it to listen 
 
 130. Id. at 353.  Katz was charged with transmitting illegal gambling wagers across state 
lines by using a telephone booth; FBI agents attached a listening device to the outside of the 
booth, and introduced the recordings at Katz’s trial. Id. at 348. 
 131. See, e.g., Sidney E. Zion, Travia Foresees New Bugging Law:  Expects Albany to 
Provide ‘Adequate Safeguards,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at 25.  Zion’s article hedges that 
whether such a statute would be possible was “in doubt,” partly because “the majority decision 
was unclear,” id., and partly because Justice Byron White’s dissent insisted that the majority’s 
conditions would be “almost impossible to satisfy,” id. (quoting Berger, 388 U.S. at 113 
(White, J., dissenting)).  Anthony J. Travia, then Speaker of the New York State Assembly, 
was more optimistic (although admirably candid about his ignorance), telling Zion:  “I haven’t 
read the decision yet, but from what I am told it appears to me that they haven’t declared 
eavesdropping and wiretapping unconstitutional per se, just that this particular statute did not 
provide adequate safeguards.” Id. 
 132. Rockefeller Signs Bill That Permits Police Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1968, 
at 49.  In a signing statement, Governor Rockefeller enthusiastically endorsed electronic 
surveillance as the “‘single most effective’ weapon against organized crime.” Id. 
 133. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
§§ 801–804, 82 Stat. 197, 211–225 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)).  
The legislation included findings from Congress that “[t]he interception of [wire and oral] 
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their 
commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.” Id. 
§ 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211. 
 134. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. at 216 (creating a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2516, entitled 
“Authorization for Interception of Wire or Oral Communications”). 
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in on conversations taking place on a telephone line.135  The FBI sought a 
further order requiring the telephone company to give it “facilities, services 
and assistance” necessary to “effectuate the interception.”136  The 
government asked for the phone company’s “consent” to the entry of the 
order of assistance, but was refused.137  The district court denied the 
government’s request, concluding that the Wiretap Act did not authorize such 
assistance,138 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.139  On appeal, the government 
invoked “the ancient principle, still recognized and applied, that law 
enforcement officers may assemble a posse comitatus, whereby private 
citizens may be required to help the police to keep the peace, and to pursue 
and arrest law violators.”140  But the Ninth Circuit disagreed.141  The court 
observed that the Wiretap Act was “extensive,” stating “in precise terms” 
what wiretaps were prohibited and which were permissible, and making 
“meticulous provision” for the manner of obtaining approval, making use of 
the information obtained, etc.142  Given that, and the conceded “total absence 
of any provision even hinting that the court is to have authority to enter such 
a unique order as the Government here seeks,” the court of appeals concluded 
that Congress had meant to “limit approved interceptions to those which 
could be accomplished without the active assistance of the carrier, or at least 
to those in which that assistance would be forthcoming on a voluntary 
basis.”143  As for posse comitatus, the Ninth Circuit said only that it was “not 
convinced” that the power “to compel a telephone company to assist in the 
investigation of suspected law violators” was analogous to the power that law 
enforcement had “to assemble a posse comitatus to keep the peace and to 
pursue and arrest law violators.”144 
The government was not pleased with this result, however plausible the 
Ninth Circuit’s reconstruction of legislative intent may have been, and 
Congress’s reaction was “immediate.”145  President Nixon signed the District 
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 on July 29, 
1970, just two months after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, amending Title III 
to reverse the outcome of In re United States.146  Section 2518 was amended 
to require that a phone company furnish the government “all information, 
 
 135. In re United States, 427 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 136. Id.  For example, the FBI wanted the telephone company to supply “leased lines and 
connecting wires or bridges.” Id. at 640 n.1. 
 137. Id. at 640. 
 138. Id. at 640–41. 
 139. Id. at 644. 
 140. Id. at 642. 
 141. Id. at 644. 
 142. Id. at 643.  At this point, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. New York 
Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), was still a few years in the future.  It is a fair question 
whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision could or would have come out the same way had New 
York Telephone Co. already been on the books.  Nonetheless, whatever the weaknesses of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision doctrinally, the legislative response detailed in the text establishes the 
main point:  that victory in the courts may presage legislative defeat. 
 143. In re United States, 427 F.2d at 643–44. 
 144. Id. at 644. 
 145. United States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 616 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 146. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970). 
2896 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception 
unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services” 
provided.147  The new provision was enacted with “little debate.”148  Indeed, 
in the bill itself, this change is simply labeled a “conforming amendment.”149  
The result is that the Wiretap Act now commands, in explicit terms, the 
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception of 
communications “unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference” to the 
provider’s services.150  The Pen Register Act now contains a similar 
provision.151  These requirements are not particularly specific, and do not 
resolve crucial questions:  how much interference with the provider’s 
services is too much?  Is there any outer limit on how much technical 
assistance (or of what sorts) a company would have to provide?  Presumably, 
yes—but the matter is not addressed in the statute itself, which is another way 
of saying Congress had no interest in spelling out such a limit. 
When it comes to the new writs of assistance, the government has already 
begun to push for legislative solutions to anticipated court-based resistance.  
That was the upshot of James Comey’s 2014 “Going Dark” speech, as 
discussed earlier152:  Comey noted that “[o]ur phones and computers have 
become reflections of our personalities, our interests, and our identities.”153  
But he lamented that the government was not “always able to access” this 
information, which was creating a “significant public safety problem.”154  He 
called for legislative changes to “keep up with changing technology and to 
maintain our ability to actually collect the communications” the government 
was interested in.155  Specifically, Comey proposed that the network service 
providers be required to build in “intercept solutions during the design 
phase”—that is, to ensure that their products could always, in principle, be 
used for surveillance.156  Although no such legislation has yet been enacted, 
the government has continued to press Congress for action:  for example, 
during the FBI’s dispute with Apple over the San Bernardino shooting, 
Comey testified before the House Intelligence Committee that the question 
of third-party assistance “isn’t going to be answered in the courts, and 
shouldn’t be”; rather, it was Congress “that should be determining the 
 
 147. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 473, 654 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012)).  A later amendment also provided that the telephone company was 
to be “compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing 
such facilities or assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). 
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 13 (1994).  The 1994 report also confirms that the 1970 
amendment was a response to In re United States. Id. 
 149. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211, 84 Stat. at 654. 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). 
 151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3124(a)–(b) (2012). 
 152. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 153. Comey, supra note 55. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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answers.”157  Comey’s prior remarks, of course, left no doubt about what that 
answer should be:  a change in the law to enable greater government 
surveillance than present doctrine might permit.158 
In sum, Congress has already afforded the government enormous power to 
issue and enforce the new writs of assistance and has generally demonstrated 
its willingness to extend those powers when asked.  Of course, many of the 
new writs of assistance are (after all) new, and so many of them do not have 
specific statutory authorization.  What then?  What about when the 
government wants to get a court to order assistance of a kind that is not 
contemplated by any statute? 
B.  The Historically Normal Roots of Compelled Third-Party Assistance 
Even when it comes to more exotic orders of construction (like the Apple 
case), or when the government wants orders of collection or production 
where there may not be specific statutory authority, the Supreme Court has 
held that the All Writs Act159 authorizes courts to require third-party 
assistance as necessary to carry out otherwise-authorized investigations.160  
Such commands may issue only under “appropriate circumstances,”161 a term 
the Court has not much elaborated on—observing only that a third party 
should not be too far removed from the underlying controversy, and that it is 
best if the assistance is not too burdensome.162  But from early English law 
to the present, the government has sought and received both compelled and 
active assistance from private parties—even when those third parties did not 
 
 157. Eric Lichtblau & Nick Wingfield, F.B.I. Chief Presses Congress to Act on Data 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/technology/fbi-
chief-presses-congress-to-act-on-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/NLF4-EVUC]. 
 158. Some legislators seemed perfectly happy to indulge the FBI.  Representative Jim 
Sensenbrenner “guarantee[d]” at one hearing that Apple would not “like what comes out of 
Congress.” Roger Cheng, Apple, FBI Face Off Before Congress over iPhone Encryption, 
CNET (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-fbi-face-off-before-
congress-over-iphone-encryption-san-bernardino-terrorist/ [https://perma.cc/T696-RERW].  
Meanwhile, two Senators reportedly developed legislation that would have implemented the 
FBI’s preferred solution. See Cory Bennett, Senate Encryption Bill Draft Mandates ‘Technical 
Assistance,’ HILL (Apr. 7, 2016, 10:49 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/275567-
senate-intel-encryption-bill-mandates-technical-assistance [https://perma.cc/J9YH-F9TP]. 
 159. The All Writs Act was enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a) (2012)).  In its original form, it provided that the “courts of the United States, shall 
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially 
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective 
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.” Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82.  It 
is codified today in substantially the same form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 160. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172–74 (1977) (holding that courts may 
“issue such commands” to third parties “as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and 
prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued” when those third parties, “though not 
parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing,” are in “a position to frustrate the 
implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice”). 
 161. Id. at 174.  This reflects the text of the All Writs Act itself, which requires that 
whatever writs are issued be “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a). 
 162. Cf. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–78. 
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wish to help and even when their reasons for not helping were entirely 
legitimate.  This history is relevant because the All Writs Act and precedent 
interpreting it are open ended, leaving courts to turn to history as a baseline 
against which to measure their decisions.163  The history of the common law 
is doctrinally relevant,164 and might be thought especially so when the 
doctrine itself is unclear or open ended.  The fact that it is historically normal 
for third parties to be required to aid the government is therefore a serious 
problem for the ex post resistance strategy.  This Part explores that history in 
some detail. 
At the time of King Edward I’s reign in England, in the thirteenth century, 
there were no professional police forces;165 rather, when a felony was 
committed, what was called the “hue and cry” was to be raised.166  If an 
ordinary resident of a town came upon a dead body, he was required to raise 
the hue167—and if he did not, he was committing a separate offense, for 
which he could be fined.168  The hue would be transmitted from village to 
village by shouting and horn-blowing until the felon was apprehended.169  
And private people were not just expected to help apprehend criminals—they 
were required to keep equipment handy for the job.170  Upon hearing the hue, 
all were required to come forth with weapons.171  A 1285 statute required the 
King’s wealthier subjects to keep items such as a “Hauberke, [a Breastplate] 
of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse.”172  In general, the rule was that 
 
 163. That is often just what the doctrine requires.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put 
it, “if a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a 
strong case” to challenge it. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).  Of course, 
Justice Holmes also wrote that it would be “revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 164. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991); see also id. at 24 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for the relevance of “the traditional practice 
of American courts”). 
 165. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 582 (1898). 
 166. Id. at 578. 
 167. Id.  Not only that, of course, but he also would likely “lay[] himself open to ugly 
suspicions.” Id.  The proper cry seems to have been “Out! Out!” or possibly “Haro” (“Hither”). 
Id. at 578–79 & 579 n.1. 
 168. Id. at 578.  Pollock and Maitland describe it as an “amerciable” offense, id., which 
means one carrying a financial penalty, see Amerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 169. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 579. 
 170. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (describing how in 
early English law, men were requested to maintain “instruments sufficient for the task”). 
 171. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 579 (noting that people were required at 
the raising of the hue to “turn out with the bows, arrows, [and] knives that they [were] bound 
to keep”). 
 172. Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 4–6 (Eng.) (alteration in original).  A hauberk 
is a sort of armor—think Conan the Barbarian. See, e.g., Conan Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 
712 F. Supp. 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing Conan’s attire as including a “hauberk [of] 
leather and mail mesh”). 
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“felons ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol,” and all “true men 
ought to take part in this work and are punishable if they neglect it.”173 
This principle of mandatory public assistance in law enforcement was 
transmitted to the American colonies and survived into the seventeenth 
century even as law enforcement started to become more professionalized.  
In 1641, Massachusetts enacted a law providing that “all Hue & cries shall 
be duly received and diligently pursued to full effect,”174 and a few years 
later, provided that anyone who “wilfully, obstinately or contemptuously 
refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to assist any Constable” would be fined forty 
shillings.175  Connecticut enacted a similar law in 1650.176  Although these 
laws differed from their Edwardian antecedents by contemplating the 
existence of a constabulary (and affording more process to anyone 
apprehended),177 the fundamental principle was the same:  ordinary people 
were required to assist with law enforcement when commanded to do so. 
The revolutionary-era controversy over the customs writs of assistance 
also illustrates this principle.178  In 1767, England directed American 
admiralty judges to issue writs “to authorize and impower the Officers of his 
Majesty’s Customs” to “enter and go into” any place to “search for and seize 
prohibited or uncustomed Goods.”179  This was the customs writ of 
assistance, which got its name from the fact that it ordered a “wide variety of 
persons to help”—that is, assist—“the customs man make his search.”180  
Local officers, yes, but also “all manner of functionaries and private folk 
 
 173. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 582.  Note that there was a species of strict 
liability attached to this process—Pollock and Maitland doubt that “a charge of false 
imprisonment could have been met by an allegation that there was reasonable cause for 
suspicion,” such that the “ordinary man seems to have been expected to be very active in the 
pursuit of malefactors and yet to ‘act at his peril.’” Id. at 582–83. 
 174. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 13 (1648).  For a very good discussion of this early history, to which I am 
indebted for many of the original sources cited here, see Jon C. Blue, High Noon Revisited:  
Commands of Assistance by Peace Officers in the Age of the Fourth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1475, 1479–82 (1992). 
 175. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 174, at 13.  In order for everyone to know who exactly they had 
to obey, the law required that every constable carry “a black staffe of five foot long, tipped at 
the upper end, about five inches with brasse, as a badge of his office, which he shal take with 
him when he goeth to discharge any part of his office.” Id. 
 176. J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 522 
(1850); see also Blue, supra note 174, at 1482. 
 177. The original hue and cry offered rather “barbaric justice.” POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 165, at 579.  In some “sea-port towns,” the criminal might be “tied to a stake below 
high-water mark and left to drown.” Id. at 496 n.7.  And process was often summary, especially 
if the felon was caught red-handed. See id. at 579–80. 
 178. See generally SMITH, supra note 51. 
 179. Id. at 1.  “In 1766, the authorities in London concluded that the statutory authority for 
the use of the writ in the American colonies was inadequate, so Parliament reauthorized use 
of the writ in the Townshend Act of 1767.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 566 n.26 (1999) (citing Townshend Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 
46, § 10 (Eng.)). 
 180. SMITH, supra note 51, at 29. 
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besides.”181  But although the customs writ of assistance caused an enormous 
controversy, especially in Boston, it was not its third-party assistance 
requirement that did so.  Rather, the objection was to the fact that the writs 
permitted searches without a showing of individualized suspicion.182  That 
is, it was the absence of cause that was a problem, not the fact that it 
contemplated the assistance of private people.  The idea that a private person 
could be dragooned into law enforcement was normal and by then, centuries 
old.183 
The principle of private assistance for the public good was sufficiently 
embedded in early American society such that it survived even the 
Revolution, the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, and similar provisions 
in the constitutions of the new states.  An 1813 New York case, Coyles v. 
Hurtin,184 is illustrative.  The sheriff in Coyles went to a house with a warrant 
to arrest several of the occupants but was resisted and outnumbered.185  The 
men were “collected in a room above stairs, making a great noise, and 
threatened to sacrifice any person who should come up.”186  When the sheriff 
asked the owner of the house to go to the room and convince the men to give 
themselves up, he replied that he would not do so “for a thousand dollars”; 
nor would he give “the names of the persons collected in the room up 
stairs.”187  Instead, the owner of the house welcomed the sheriff to “do his 
duty,” and promised that he would not interfere, but did nothing more.188  
Understandably reluctant to try and apprehend several rowdy laborers on his 
own, the sheriff ordered the owner of the house (along with three other men) 
to stand guard while he went to get help, and to “prevent the escape of the 
men.”189  The men eventually escaped while the sheriff was gone, and the 
 
 181. Id.  As Smith notes, requiring such assistance was “not new,” as “[c]ommunal 
responsibility for maintenance of the public peace went back long before the Norman 
Conquest” in the eleventh century. Id. 
 182. See O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 43–44 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).  The customs writ of 
assistance was also controversial in Boston for other reasons.  Charles Paxton, the government 
official at the center of the Boston writs-of-assistance controversy, was described by Sam 
Adams as “the most insincere, plausible, and insinuating of mankind.” 1 THE WRITINGS OF 
SAMUEL ADAMS 1764–1769, at 259–64 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904); see also SMITH, 
supra note 51, at 101 (discussing Adams’s remark, as well as Paxton’s epithet as “every man’s 
humble servant, but no man’s friend,” and concluding that there were “few figures in the 
revolutionary period” who could have had a worse public image). 
 183. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of 
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 77–78 (1996) (describing this assistance power as 
having added “a vague and possibly tyrannical new layer of bodily intrusion and unchecked 
discretion into the system”).  It may well seem that way to us.  But as the text indicates, this 
layer of intrusion, tyrannical and vague though it may have been, was not as new as Professor 
Amar suggests. 
 184. 10 Johns. 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). 
 185. Id. at 85.  The objects of the arrest warrant had apparently “taken refuge” in a house 
near the evocatively named “Drowned Lands” and were “determined to resist, by force, the 
execution of the warrant.” Id. 
 186. Id. at 86. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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sheriff arrested the owner of the house for not being helpful enough, for 
which the owner sued the sheriff for assault and battery and false 
imprisonment.190  The owner won the lawsuit, but was reversed on appeal,191 
with the reversing court holding that “[e]very man is bound to be aiding and 
assisting, upon order or summons, in preserving the peace and apprehending 
offenders, and is punishable, if he refuses.”192 
Coyles is representative of the early American tradition requiring private 
people to assist the government with law enforcement when commanded.193  
That tradition continued into the nineteenth century where, for example, 
public regulation of slavery in the American South required even those who 
did not own slaves to join so-called “slave patrols”—groups charged with 
enforcing slave laws.194  These patrols were explicitly modeled on the 
tradition of “the ‘hue and cry’ that a constable would bellow in the wake of 
elusive criminals,” and were a direct descendent of “the posse comitatus, the 
bands of men called out in early modern England to chase down and arrest 
fleeing felons.”195  In 1845, the governor of South Carolina explained to a 
leading English abolitionist that “[w]ith us, every citizen is concerned in the 
maintenance of order” among what he called “the lowest class who are our 
slaves.”196 
Summarizing the doctrine in the early part of the twentieth century, 
Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, put 
it this way:  “Still, as in the days of Edward I, the citizenry may be called 
upon to enforce the justice of the State, not faintly and with lagging steps, but 
honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities are 
convenient and at hand.”197  Even today, most states continue to authorize 
police officers to demand the assistance of bystanders as they carry out their 
 
 190. Id. at 85–86. 
 191. Id. at 87, 89. 
 192. Id. at 88. 
 193. Until the nineteenth century, the power to compel private citizens to assist with 
enforcement of the law was often thought to be reserved to state and local governments. See 
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine:  Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft 
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 15–19 (2008).  Though the 
“principle of compulsory service” was “deeply embedded in the fabric of state and local 
governance,” it was “almost altogether lacking at the federal level.” Id. at 15.  As with many 
features of the federal-state relationship, however, there was a profound alteration in this 
understanding after the Civil War, which is discussed further below. See infra notes 197–215 
and accompanying text. 
 194. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS:  LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE 
CAROLINAS 1–2 (2001). 
 195. Id. at 3; see also supra notes 165–73.  What made slave patrols distinct in America 
was their “reliance upon race as a defining feature”; although the patrols included non-slave-
owners, they “did not include free blacks,” a “singular difference that set slave patrols apart.” 
HADDEN, supra note 194, at 2, 4. 
 196. Slavery at the South, 7 DEBOW’S REV. 289, 296 (1849). 
 197. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928).  Babington was a 
chauffeur, who was in his car when a police officer “jumped on the running board [of his car] 
and ordered [him] to chase another car in order to arrest its occupant.” Id. at 726.  Suddenly, 
another vehicle cut across Babington’s path, which caused an accident killing Babington. Id. 
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duties.198  In New York, it is a crime to unreasonably refuse aid to a police 
officer in effecting an arrest or preventing the commission of a crime.199 
In United States v. New York Telephone Co.,200 the Supreme Court 
considered the government’s power to compel assistance in the installation 
of pen registers, devices attached to a telephone line that recorded numbers 
dialed.201  In the 1970s, unlike today, no law explicitly required telephone 
companies to assist in the installation of such devices.202  Lower courts had 
split on the question of whether such assistance was therefore required.203  In 
its brief to the Supreme Court, New York Telephone Co. made arguments 
much like the ones made by network service providers today.204  “[O]utside 
of Title III,” the company argued, there is “no express statutory authority 
which provides that unwilling third parties, such as Respondent, may be 
directed to affirmatively assist law enforcement in effecting a pen register 
interception.”205  “The most disturbing aspect of the Government’s position,” 
the company continued, was its claim that courts “can, without statutory 
specification, direct orders to private citizens to participate in law 
enforcement without the extent of such power being spelled out in clearly 
 
 198. See Blue, supra note 174, at 1475 n.2, 1476 n.3 (collecting statutes).  Some states 
authorize the officer to make the command but do not apparently criminalize the refusal; others 
do, with varying punishments. Id. 
 199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 2018).  The practice commentary suggests that 
this is only a crime if it is possible to safely assist, but cites nothing in support of this 
proposition. See id. § 195.10 note (McKinney 2010) (William C. Donnino, Practice 
Commentary).  At any rate, it is difficult to imagine how it could ever be genuinely safe to 
help a police officer arrest someone. 
 200. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
 201. Id. at 161 & n.1; see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that such devices do not “involve 
any monitoring of telephone conversations”); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 
1038 n.1 (D. Md. 1972) (describing a pen register as a device that, at least in 1972, “record[ed] 
on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed” (quoting United States v. Caplan, 
255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966))). 
 202. As discussed at greater length below, for a wiretap, there was an explicit statutory duty 
to assist. See supra notes 225–64, 292 and accompanying text.  But a pen register is not a 
wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012) (defining a wiretap intercept as “the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other device” (emphasis added)).  Therefore, the installation of 
a pen register was not subject to the statute requiring assistance in the “interception of any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication.” Id. § 2518(4). 
 203. The Seventh Circuit found it “more congruent with both reason and Congressional 
intent to have courts, rather than the telephone company, decide if a pen register should or 
should not be used,” and so thought that the “authority to compel the cooperation of the 
telephone company [was] in a sense concomitant of the power to authorize the installation of 
a pen register, for without the former the latter would be worthless.” United States v. Ill. Bell 
Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976).  The Second Circuit (in a similar case) concluded 
that a district court’s command of assistance represented an abuse of discretion:  absent 
explicit “Congressional authority, such an order could establish a most undesirable, if not 
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid 
on private third parties.” In re United States, 538 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 204. See generally Brief for New York Telephone Co., N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (No. 
76-835), 1977 WL 189311. 
 205. Id. at 25. 
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defined statutes.”206  “It is one thing,” in other words, “for courts to act to 
prevent an obstruction of their orders; it is quite another to dragoon unwilling 
private parties into affirmative participation.”207 
But the phone company lost.208  It was a close decision—five to four—but 
in the end, the government proved that it did not need specific statutory 
authorization to compel private companies to aid it in surveillance.209  Rather, 
the assistance order was “clearly authorized by the All Writs Act.”210  In 
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that if “the All Writs Act confers 
authority to order persons to aid the Government in the performance of its 
duties,” then it “provides a sweeping grant of authority entirely without 
precedent in our Nation’s history.”211  But that is just the problem:  such 
dragooned assistance is historically normal, and presents serious doctrinal 
risks to the ex post resistance strategy to these new writs of assistance. 
Today, the government’s use of the All Writs Act to compel third-party aid 
is very common.212  The government recently disclosed that it has used the 
Act to order the unlocking of Apple phones alone “at least” seventy times 
since 2008.213  That is not to say that this use has gone unquestioned:  
Magistrate Judge James Orenstein explicitly raised separation-of-powers 
concerns about the government’s use of the Act in a 2016 Brooklyn hearing 
in a drug case, and eventually ruled against the government.214  But the broad 
trend toward government surveillance is quite clear, and it is consistent with 
the historical evidence laid out above.215 
To be sure, there are doctrinal limits on the responsibilities of third parties 
to assist law enforcement—though the present contours of those limits are 
imprecise and fact dependent.  The Supreme Court held in New York 
Telephone Co. that courts may only compel third-party assistance under the 
All Writs Act in “appropriate circumstances,” such as where a third party is 
not too far “removed from the underlying controversy,” and where an order 
of assistance is not too “burdensome.”216  Similarly vague bounds exist on 
 
 206. Id. at 34. 
 207. Id. 
 208. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 176–78. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 172. 
 211. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 212. The ACLU has constructed a map detailing modern cases involving the Act and cell 
phones, and it has counted sixty-three confirmed cases as of 2016. Eliza Sweren-Becker, This 
Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight Was About Much More Than One Phone, ACLU (Mar. 
30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-
was-about-much-more-one-phone [https://perma.cc/FAW5-RLU5]. 
 213. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds Say Apple Has Unlocked Suspects’ iPhones ‘At 
Least’ 70 Times in the Past, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 26, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://motherboard. 
vice.com/en_us/article/4xagvq/feds-say-apple-has-unlocked-suspects-iphones-at-least-70-
times-in-the-past [https://perma.cc/V2UW-C3FK]. 
 214. In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 361–63, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75 (majority opinion).  The opinion by Justice White 
is a bit of a hash:  it does not say, or attempt to, which of the many “facts of this case” are the 
crucial ones.  For instance, the Court’s opinion observes that New York Telephone Co. was a 
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subpoenas and other means of compelled private assistance.  It is therefore 
plausible to imagine courts sustaining objections to the new writs of 
assistance (or at least the most radical of them) on doctrinal grounds, and the 
briefs of network service providers have generally called for exactly that.217  
But such arguments must grapple with the formidable historical precedents 
discussed above.218 
Doctrine can also change, which might be appropriate precisely because 
these new writs of assistance are new:  they call for forms of assistance 
previously unheard of or, at minimum, for the collection of information that 
has never before existed.  In these circumstances, doctrinal change may well 
be required.  The Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United States,219 for 
example, that the Fourth Amendment should be construed to ensure at least 
“that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.”220  Thus, the Fourth Amendment regards as a 
“search” not just physical intrusions into the home, but even the “obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology [of] any information regarding the interior of 
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained.”221  If the new writs 
of assistance diminish individual privacy, and current doctrine does not 
proscribe such diminishment, then one available argument is that cases like 
Kyllo require the current doctrine to change.  Doctrinal response and 
adjustment to technological change is part of American legal doctrine (at 
least in the Fourth Amendment).222  And, apart from the technological issues 
at play in this Article, the general presumption in favor of third-party 
assistance has also been questioned on doctrinal grounds.223  At least one 
scholar has argued that the Constitution should be understood to place 
important limits on commands of assistance.224 
 
“highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public.” Id.  Is that important, or simply 
a helpful atmospheric fact?  The Court does not say. 
 217. See, e.g., Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist 
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance, In re Search 
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant, No. CM-16-10 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), ECF No. 16.  This brief argues that the All Writs Act does not confer the 
authority to compel Apple’s assistance, id. at 15–19, that New York Telephone Co. is not to 
the contrary, id. at 20, and (more esoterically) that compelled assistance in these circumstances 
would violate the First and Fifth Amendments, id. at 32–34. 
 218. See supra Part II.B. 
 219. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 220. Id. at 34.  At issue in Kyllo was the use of “a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private 
home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home.” Id. at 29.  The 
question presented was whether this was a search of the home under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id.  The Court held that it was. Id. at 40. 
 221. Id. at 34. 
 222. It is equally true, though, that the “law, though jealous of individual privacy,” has not 
always “kept pace with . . . advances in scientific knowledge.” Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 49 (1967); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (concluding that 
government wiretaps were not searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they 
are accomplished without physically intruding into the home), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 223. See generally Blue, supra note 174. 
 224. Id. at 1484–86.  Judge Jon C. Blue argues that the Fourth Amendment is implicated 
wherever “an officer by a show of authority ‘has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
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Nonetheless, the doctrinal obstacles for ex post resistance are formidable.  
Even absent specific legislative authorization, for centuries courts have 
generally been willing to force third parties to assist the government in law 
enforcement and surveillance.  Therefore, even if the legislature does not act 
to expand the government’s powers, existing doctrine is likely more than 
enough to help the government learn everything it needs. 
C.  Executive Circumvention of Surveillance Limitations 
Even if legislatures and courts purport to constrain the executive’s power 
to access information stored on networked devices and services, there is still 
a final danger:  that the government may attempt to acquire information from 
network intermediaries without court approval and in contravention of 
statutory authority.  Historically, this is not in any sense farfetched.  This does 
not necessarily require the government to knowingly break the law in the 
ordinary sense although there are ample instances where that occurs.  What 
it requires is some combination of (1) a generous view of the government’s 
inherent powers to conduct necessary surveillance; (2) a narrow view of 
restrictions on those powers; and (3) as much secrecy, and as little court 
involvement, as possible to ensure that those generous and narrow views are 
not subject to public or coordinate-branch oversight.  This Part details this 
phenomenon. 
At least as far back as Franklin Roosevelt, presidents have asserted the 
ability to engage in surveillance beyond what courts and legislatures have 
authorized them to engage in—and even in contravention of their 
proscriptions.  When Roosevelt became president, Olmstead was the law of 
the land, and wiretapping was unregulated for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
But Olmstead had also drawn considerable negative public attention,225 and 
almost immediately after it was decided, members of Congress began to 
introduce legislation to curb wiretapping.226  Congress first prohibited the 
 
citizen.’” Id. at 1485 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).  The implications 
of that rule, Judge Blue argues, are “reasonably clear” for “commands of assistance.” Id.  A 
person given such a command has been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that 
seizure must be reasonable—an unlikely proposal when an “attempt by an unarmed civilian to 
apprehend a suspected criminal” is, in many circumstances, “a form of Russian roulette.” Id. 
at 1486. 
 225. See Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality 
of the NSA Surveillance Program:  The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2008).  
Katyal and Caplan quote a representative New York Times editorial:  “Prohibition, having bred 
crimes innumerable, has succeeded in making the Government the instigator, abettor and 
accomplice of crime.  It has now made universal snooping possible.” Id. (quoting Editorial, 
Government Lawbreaking, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1928, at 24).  Katyal and Caplan, supra, 
discuss many of the historical materials cited here at greater length, and I commend their 
account of the Roosevelt-era materials to interested readers. 
 226. 74 CONG. REC. 3, 2901–02 (1931); see also Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1036–
37 (briefly detailing some congressional debates on the subject).  There was not much need 
for such legislation initially because the Justice Department insisted that it did not engage in 
wiretapping—J. Edgar Hoover, at least, publicly insisted as much. 74 CONG. REC. 2901–02 
(1931).  The head of the Prohibition Bureau at the time, Amos Woodcock, had no such qualms, 
however; when asked if he engaged in wiretapping, Woodcock said, “We do; and the Supreme 
Court has approved that practice.” WALTER F. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL:  A CASE 
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use of appropriated funds for wiretaps by the Prohibition Bureau,227 and soon 
after, enacted the Communications Act of 1934,228 which forbade 
interception of any “interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio.”229  
Although the Roosevelt administration argued that the Communications Act 
did not forbid wiretapping,230 the Supreme Court rejected that reading by 
concluding that “the plain words of [section] 605 forbid anyone, unless 
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message.”231  The 
government initially complied with the Court’s ruling, although not without 
some reluctance.232  And after a few more decisions on the Act’s scope, then-
Attorney General Robert Jackson announced that he understood the Congress 
and the Supreme Court to have forbidden the practice of wiretapping 
altogether.233 
J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the FBI, strongly disagreed with 
Jackson’s conclusions,234 and he told President Roosevelt that he 
“desperately” needed wiretapping authority to engage in surveillance of 
suspected Nazi spies.235  Roosevelt then authorized the surveillance in a 
 
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1965); see also Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 
1036–37 (canvassing this history).  Woodcock evidently came to change his mind about 
wiretapping, or so reported at least one St. Louis newspaper editorial noted in the 
Congressional Record. 75 CONG. REC. 4733 (1932). 
 227. Pub. L. No. 72-387, tit. II, 47 Stat. 1371, 1381 (1933).  Congress appropriated 
$8,440,000 in all to the Prohibition Bureau, provided that “no part of this appropriation 
[would] be used for or in connection with ‘wire tapping’ to procure evidence of violations of 
the National Prohibition Act.” Id.  The appropriation also banned the use of these funds for 
“the purchase of intoxicating liquors which are consumed by the investigator or anyone with 
him,” id., an intriguing proviso that is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of this Article. 
 228. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 (2012)). 
 229. Id. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1103. 
 230. JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT’S SECRET WAR 35 (2001).  Katyal and Caplan 
elliptically criticize this reading as one arrived at “[d]espite the Act’s text.” See Katyal & 
Caplan, supra note 225, at 1038.  I am more sympathetic to it, at least as an initial textual 
matter:  the section is titled “Unauthorized Publication of Communications,” for one thing. 
§ 605, 48 Stat. at 1103 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded 
otherwise, see Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1937), and that is what matters 
for purposes of the argument here. 
 231. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 382.  The case concerned (what else?) bootlegging, specifically, 
a plan to smuggle about 1600 cases of liquor into the Port of New York. United States v. 
Nardone, 90 F.2d 630, 630–31 (2d Cir. 1937) (Hand, J.), rev’d, 302 U.S. 379.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that “Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should 
go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with 
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.” Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383.  The Supreme 
Court weighed in twice more on the scope of the 1934 Act:  first, to confirm that the 
government could not make derivative use of the substance of the recorded calls, Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939); and second, to hold that the Act banned wiretapping 
of intrastate, as well as interstate, calls, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939). 
 232. The day after the decision, the New York Times quoted anonymous Justice Department 
officials suggesting that the Court’s opinion (when read carefully) did not, in fact, prohibit 
wiretapping. High Court Bars Testimony Based on Wire-Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1937, 
at 1.  The Times reported that there was “a question in the minds of some Department of Justice 
officials whether listening in on telephone conversations was not still permissible.” Id. 
 233. See CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER:  THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 231 (1991). 
 234. See id. (discussing Hoover’s leaks to the press about the ways in which Jackson’s ban 
was harming investigations). 
 235. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1050 (quoting PERSICO, supra note 230, at 35). 
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memorandum stating that he was “convinced” that the Court’s decisions 
interpreting the 1934 prohibition did not apply “to grave matters involving 
the defense of the nation,”236 and accordingly approved wiretaps of “persons 
suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United 
States.”237  Roosevelt phrased his analysis as consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, and so retained a fig leaf of legality.  The memorandum’s analysis 
was “to put it mildly, weak,”238 but that did not matter as the memorandum 
was also secret.239 
The scope of the wiretapping was not confined, in practice, to the sorts of 
Nazi saboteur situations that might have been at the forefront of Roosevelt’s 
mind:  Jackson admitted that he had authorized it in a case involving a routine 
domestic kidnapping.240  Hoover wanted to, and did, spy on labor 
organizations.241  One newspaper columnist was suspected of a “most subtle 
type of espionage activity” against the United States, and wiretapped on that 
basis.242  Though the investigation turned up no such evidence, it did reveal 
that the columnist was engaged in an affair with a young John F. Kennedy, 
evidence that remained in Hoover’s files until his death.243 
The decades after World War II saw further abuses.  From the 1950s to the 
1970s, the CIA secretly intercepted, opened, and read postal mail without a 
warrant (ostensibly to gather foreign intelligence),244 despite this being 
 
 236. Id. (quoting Memorandum from President Franklin Roosevelt to Attorney Gen. Robert 
H. Jackson (May 21, 1940) (on file with the Library of Congress, Robert H. Jackson Papers, 
Box 94, Folder 6)). 
 237. Id. at 1025 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7). 
 238. Id. at 1050. 
 239. Id.; see also id. at 1051 (“There was no wiggle room in the Court’s opinions, as 
members of FDR’s Administration themselves told Congress when they sought changes to the 
1934 Act in the wake of Nardone I and II.  But FDR got away with his legal maneuvering 
because, after all, his memo was secret.”). 
 240. To Authorize Wire Tapping:  Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. 
No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 17, 19 (1941) (printing letters from Hon. 
Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, regarding H.R. 2266 and 3099). 
 241. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 187–93 (Athan Theoharis ed., 1991).  
As Katyal and Caplan note, it is now “quite clear” that surveillance of labor and other affiliated 
groups took place. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1058.  They included 
wiretaps of organizations and businesses as varied as the NAACP, Kyffhaeuser 
Bund, and the Revolutionary Workers League.  In addition, many unions were 
surveilled, including the CIO Maritime Committee, CIO Food, Tobacco, 
Agricultural & Allied Workers of America, International Longshoremen’s and 
Warehousemen’s Union (CIO), National Maritime Union, National Negro Labor 
Council, National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards, United Electrical Radio 
& Machine Workers of America, and the United Public Workers of America—CIO. 
Id. 
 242. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 241, at 15. 
 243. Id. at 15–16; Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1059; see also Athan Theoharis, 
FBI Wiretapping:  A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 101, 111 (1992) 
(detailing Roosevelt’s somewhat bizarre personal involvement in this particular incident). 
 244. See David Wise, The CIA Burglar Who Went Rogue, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-cia-burglar-who-went-rogue-36739394/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4DG-SC8A] (“[T]he CIA screened more than 28 million first-class letters 
and opened 215,000 of them between 1953 and 1973, even though . . . the Fourth Amendment 
bars third parties from opening first-class mail without a warrant.”). 
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firmly established as illegal for nearly a century.245  Just as before, the 
investigations soon went beyond that purpose, and eventually the CIA began 
reading mail to or from figures such as Hubert Humphrey, John Steinbeck, 
and Martin Luther King.246  Other similar intelligence abuses eventually led 
to the creation of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities247—popularly known as 
the “Church Committee,” after its chair.248  Senator Church summarized his 
fears in a 1975 episode of Meet the Press: 
If this government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge 
in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community 
has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there 
would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine 
together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was 
done, is within the reach of the government to know.249 
Church feared a one-way ratchet:  past a certain point, there is a degree of 
government surveillance that begins to operate on the norms of democracy 
itself.250 
More recently, the Bush administration authorized the National Security 
Agency to intercept communications into and out of the United States when 
the agency believed that at least one party was a member of Al Qaeda or a 
related terrorist organization.251  These interceptions were carried out without 
 
 245. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“The constitutional guaranty of the right 
of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends 
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.  Whilst in the mail, they 
can only be opened and examined under like warrant.”); see also United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) (“It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters 
and sealed packages subject to letter postage—as distinguished from newspapers, magazines, 
pamphlets, and other printed matter—is free from inspection by postal authorities, except in 
the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 246. MICHAEL HOLZMAN, JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, THE CIA, AND THE CRAFT OF 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 171–72 (2008).  The justification for this program was so perverse as 
to be almost admirable:  “precisely because the enemy regarded America’s mails as inviolate,” 
inspection of the mail was thought “likely to provide clues to the identities of Soviet agents.” 
Id. at 172 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE 148 (1994)).  The program 
was justified along the same lines Roosevelt envisioned:  surely, “any restrictions on 
government mail-opening must . . . have read into them an exception that would allow CIA to 
cover mail in time of secret war.” Id. (quoting RIEBLING, supra, at 148). 
 247. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at III (1976). 
 248. See, e.g., Church Committee Created, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artand 
history/history/minute/Church_Committee_Created.htm [https://perma.cc/UE2P-5C9P] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing the creation of the Committee on January 27, 1975).  
 249. NBCUniversal Archives, The Intelligence Gathering Debate—
www.NBCUniversalArchives.com, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=YAG1N4a84Dk [https://perma.cc/ME7L-FSZH] (showing an excerpt of a Meet the 
Press episode from August 17, 1975). 
 250. This is also essentially the fear of Professor Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 1912 
(“Under such conditions, liberal democracy as a form of government is replaced, gradually 
but surely, by a different form of government that I will call modulated democracy because it 
relies on a form of surveillance that operates by modulation.”). 
 251. See generally OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS, 
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009).  What exactly to 
call this program is a politically charged question.  The Bush administration referred to it 
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any court authorization, simply done on the President’s say-so.252  Nor were 
they authorized by any legislation, instead being reauthorized by the 
President every forty-five days.253  The Bush administration officials who 
implemented this surveillance program did not regard themselves as acting 
extralegally—just as Roosevelt had not.  But, just as with Roosevelt, it is hard 
to conclude that the bulk interception of telecommunications without a 
warrant was anything other than a flagrant violation of both judicial doctrine 
and legislative command—or so the vast majority of commentators, on the 
left and the right, concluded.254  Even the program’s internal constraints were 
controversial and prompted near-resignation of nearly the entire senior 
leadership of the Justice Department.255 
When Congress legislatively authorized the Bush-era surveillance 
(consistent, note, with the argument that the legislature is generally a willing 
partner in government collection of private information), the government 
interpreted the authority incredibly broadly—again, in secret.  Section 702 of 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 authorized electronic surveillance of 
“persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.”256  The 
executive branch interpreted that authority to permit acquisition of 
communications about people who were outside the United States, not just to 
or from them,257 and of anyone who was not affirmatively known to be inside 
 
publicly as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program.” Id. at 1, 6.  The legislation passed in 2008 to 
address the program refers to it as “the intelligence activity involving communications that 
was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and 
ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio 
address on December 17, 2005.” FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
§ 301(a)(3), 122 Stat. 2436, 2471 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 50 U.S.C.).  
David Addington (a prominent administration lawyer and close aide to Vice President Cheney) 
apparently referred to it simply as “the president’s program.” BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER:  
THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 280 (2008). 
 252. The government acknowledged as much. See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 
251, at 6 (“[T]he President and other Administration officials acknowledged that these 
activities included the interception without a court order.”); see also James Risen & Eric 
Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/spying-program-snared-us-calls.html 
[https://perma.cc/ST2W-JVP3] (describing the program as one “approved by President Bush 
to conduct eavesdropping without warrants”). 
 253. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 251, at 6 (“The Presidential Authorizations 
were issued at intervals of approximately every 45 days.”). 
 254. See John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 565, 567 (2007) (“Fire rained down not only from the left, but also from the 
right.”). 
 255. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence:  Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the 
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?—Part IV:  Hearing of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 218–21 (2007) (statement of James B. Comey, former Deputy U.S. Attorney 
General, Department of Justice) (testifying that at least a large segment of the senior leadership 
of the Department of Justice, including then-FBI Director (Robert Mueller III) and Attorney 
General (John Ashcroft) had at the time contemplated resigning because the President was not 
obeying legal restrictions on the program). 
 256. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 257. Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and 
Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 158 (2015) (describing how the National 
Security Agency adopted “procedures that allow analysts to acquire information ‘about’ 
selectors (that is, communications modes used by targets) or targets, and not merely 
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the United States—with no duty to investigate whether they were or not.258  
The result was “widespread” interception of communications made by 
Americans,259 along with public misrepresentations to the Supreme Court 
about how the government was implementing the program.260 
The government might well attempt to get private user data information 
from network intermediaries absent legislative authorization or court order.  
A cooperative intermediary might gladly go along.261  But even an 
uncooperative intermediary might find its cooperation ordered, in secret, 
without any practical method to challenge it in court, or its user data simply 
intercepted at some other point on the internet as it is transmitted.  This would 
pose certain technical challenges, the most important of which would be the 
acquisition of the intermediary’s private encryption keys.  It is the 
government’s view, however, that it can demand those keys with a subpoena 
or the Stored Communications Act, which, as discussed above,262 do not 
require a warrant or probable cause.263 
This sort of executive legality risk should be the final nail in the coffin for 
an ex post resistance strategy.  Even if courts protect our data under current 
law and legislatures back them up, that is no guarantee that a motivated 
member of the executive branch at whatever level will not simply go and get 
the information it wants anyway, however it can. 
The above summarizes risks.  Its pessimistic account is one of what could 
happen if network intermediaries continue to collect large amounts of private 
 
communications to or from targets (or selectors employed by targets), or information held by 
targets themselves”). 
 258. Id. (describing the government’s “presumption of non-U.S. person status”). 
 259. See Hon. Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity:  Lessons from the Shadows, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 623, 625 (2017); see also Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker 
at C.I.A. Says He Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-
data.html [https://perma.cc/QDP5-Z4AE] (noting that “the Justice Department had secretly 
obtained phone logs for reporters at The Associated Press and Fox News”). 
 260. Lynch, supra note 259, at 626 (noting that “the Solicitor General had represented to 
the [Supreme] Court, believing it to be true, that the government had given notices to criminal 
defendants where warrantless surveillance had been the source of evidence against them,” 
which was not true). 
 261. As “far back as World War II,” the National Security Agency has “had classified 
relationships with carefully vetted U.S. companies that assist with essential foreign 
intelligence-gathering activities.” Office of Inspector Gen., Report No. ST-09-0002, Working 
Draft 28 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/2013 
0816/NSA%20IG%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VMP-LJZ8].  After the September 11 
attacks, two telecommunications companies (widely believed to be Verizon and AT&T) 
“contacted [the] NSA and asked, ‘What can we do to help?’” Declan McCullagh, Surveillance 
‘Partnership’ Between NSA and Telcos Points to AT&T, Verizon, CNET (June 27, 2013, 2:40 
PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/surveillance-partnership-between-nsa-and-telcos-points-to-
at-t-verizon/ [https://perma.cc/979H-RPKY]. 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
 263. See, e.g., United States v. Lavabit, LLC, 749 F.3d 276, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
Government obtained a seizure warrant from the district court under the Stored 
Communications Act . . . .  The seizure warrant provided that Lavabit was to turn over ‘[a]ll 
information necessary to decrypt communications sent to or from [the target’s] Lavabit email 
account . . . , including encryption keys and SSL keys.’” (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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data about private people—the risks we run if we persist on the current path.  
Of course, these risks might not come to pass.  Courts might read the 
government’s existing authority narrowly, legislatures might deny the 
government any further authority, and the executive might obey those 
directions.  That would be a good result, and there is nothing wrong with 
pursuing that strategy even while one understands it may fail. 
But the risks of error in this situation are not symmetric.  If network 
intermediaries continue to stockpile private data and successfully resist 
government demands for aid that would be socially harmful, we will enjoy 
modest but certain benefits:  our location will be used by our devices to 
enhance restaurant recommendations, our in-home always-on speakers will 
play music at our spoken command, and our search results will be more 
personalized for us.  But if they do not succeed in this strategy, the data will 
have already been collected and it will be too late to do anything about it—
exposing us to stochastic and largely unbounded harms.  Nassim Taleb has 
called this property (benefits that are “small and visible,” with side effects 
that are “potentially severe and invisible”) “fragility.”264  Ex post resistance 
might work, but it is a very fragile strategy. 
III.  REGULATING PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE 
This Part grapples with the possibility that the government might get 
access to whatever network intermediaries can and do learn about us.  Soon, 
if we are not there already, those intermediaries will know essentially 
everything.  Call this the panoptic presumption.  If it is accepted, not as a 
normative argument but a descriptive reality, what would follow?265 
This Part argues that this state of affairs increases the normative 
desirability of regulating the information about us that can be collected and 
retained by network intermediaries.  Market forces cannot do the job because 
the “market for privacy” has a number of well-understood failures—and 
introducing government surveillance into the mix only magnifies those 
failures.  Instead, personal information should be treated as a potentially 
harmful asset, the collection and retention of which should be regulated ex 
ante. 
 
 264. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE:  THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 9–11 
(2012). 
 265. Because of the nature of the argument in Part II, the panoptic presumption is not meant 
to be taken as a literal prediction that the government will in fact acquire all of the information 
held by network intermediaries.  Different observers might have differing assessments of how 
strong the presumption should be understood to be based on differing assessments of the 
likelihood of what this Article calls “legality risk.”  Whatever one’s assessment in this respect, 
it would scale the need for the recommendations in Part III accordingly—that is, to whatever 
extent one believes the panoptic presumption is a descriptively accurate consequence of the 
new writs of assistance, it should follow that the solutions in Part III should be regarded as 
necessary to the same extent. 
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A.  The Failures in the Market for Privacy 
Why not just allow individual people to decide what they share with 
network intermediaries, and take seriously the privacy consequences of those 
voluntary choices?266  After all, as Jerry Kang has noted, one might 
“reasonably view personal information as a valuable commodity that should 
be exchanged on the free market.”267  And indeed, Stephanos Bibas has 
argued that a “contractual approach” to data privacy is the right one, at least 
in some circumstances.268 
But a purely individual-choice model will not work because genuine 
freedom of choice requires information and the power to choose.269  As to 
the former, an enormous amount of information about people is gathered 
without their knowledge, much less their consent.270  Further, people are 
quite poor at assessing the harms that may result from even consensual 
disclosure of their private data—it is hard to assess the harms it will lead to 
in the future, and “the trivial and incremental character of each loss . . . tends 
to minimize its ultimate effect.”271  This problem is especially severe when 
it comes to evaluating secondary and tertiary consumers of personal 
information.272  As to the existence of power to choose, as Paul Schwartz has 
argued, surveillance itself can erode choice:  “the more that is known about 
 
 266. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has 
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”).  Such a person is said to have “assumed the risk” of disclosure, at least 
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 744.  This “third-party doctrine” enjoys near-universal 
contempt among criminal procedure scholars. See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(c) (4th ed. 2004) (stating that this 
doctrine is “dead wrong”); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a 
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an individual, the easier it is to force his obedience.”273  And even fully 
informed and autonomous individuals have less power over the collection of 
information about them than they think.274  Companies are generally free, 
under American law, to collect information about people with whom they 
have no contractual relationship, and use it for their own purposes.275 
That is the standard answer—but the argument in Part II suggests a further 
one.  Even if individuals can master the privacy consequences of surrendering 
their private information to companies, there are unique challenges to the 
“consent” model when that private disclosure may result in government 
surveillance.  Government surveillance is often conducted in secret and 
outside the ordinary court system;276 even when it is done as part of criminal 
law enforcement, the user may have no way to know that his or her 
information is being demanded or that it has been turned over.  Indeed, the 
user may not even have standing to object to the third party’s disclosure of 
his or her information to the government.277  How is a person supposed to 
meaningfully “consent” to a regime like that?  If we must “consent” to the 
possibility of secret government surveillance to use any network service, then 
that consent in and of itself creates the harms described in Part I:  an 
uncertainty about whether we are ever being watched, and the accompanying 
self-censorship and lack of breathing space for ordinary human flourishing. 
For related reasons, it is not feasible to expect ordinary market competition 
to solve the problems identified in Parts I and II.  To be sure, conscientious 
network service providers could voluntarily choose to learn less about their 
users.278  Some companies do choose to gather as little user data as they can, 
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or at least less than their competitors do.279  But there are serious limits to 
this good-intentions model of network-intermediary behavior.  For one thing, 
network service providers must build their products in compliance with 
applicable law, which may restrict their design decisions.  Rozenshtein 
argues that it may be necessary to “demand technological impact assessments 
before a technology company develops a product or service that disrupts a 
key government function like effective surveillance.”280  Whatever the merits 
of such proposals or their feasibility, it would be necessary for network 
service providers of any meaningful size to obey them if they were 
implemented.281 
More to the point, many network intermediaries have built their businesses 
on collecting private user data.  Knowing things about people is valuable, at 
least potentially.  It is of no use to tell a digital-advertising network that it 
should learn less about the people who see its ads:  that information is their 
asset.  So for as long as collecting such user data remains legal and valuable, 
companies that decline to do so will operate at a relative competitive 
disadvantage to those that do not.282 
B.  Information as a Toxic Asset 
A better solution is to recognize that personal information, for all its value 
to the companies that gather it, also has harmful side effects.  It is, as Schneier 
puts it, a potentially “toxic asset.”283  The question is what to do about it.  The 
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widespread collection of private data, which in turn enables government 
surveillance, is not something individual people can easily avoid.  It is also 
caused by the instrumentally rational decisions of businesses.  Yet it threatens 
serious social harm.  That is a classic sort of market failure—an 
environmental externality.  In his classic article “The Tragedy of the 
Commons,” Garrett Hardin analogized the problem of pollution to the 
decisions facing self-interested herdsmen grazing their flock on an open 
pasture.284  Just as each herdsman asks only about “the utility to me of adding 
one more animal to my herd,”285 so too must each network intermediary only 
ask about the value to themselves of collecting, storing, and retaining the 
marginal bit of user data.  Just as a rational herdsman will therefore tend to 
“add another animal to his herd” (“[a]nd another; and another”),286 so too 
will intermediaries tend to stockpile data that may be of commercial use to 
them.  The grazing of animals, to be clear, is socially useful, just as collecting 
information is—but grazing also produces social harm, just as the collection 
of information does.  The problem is that the herdsman does not bear that 
harm personally, just as network intermediaries are not the ones who are 
principally harmed by the enhanced potential for surveillance.  In the face of 
these mismatched incentives, we must, as Hardin advocates, avoid the 
looming tragedy by legislating not prohibition but “temperance.”287 
This Part lays out a framework for what temperance might look like.  In 
the context of environmental law, Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz 
have argued that a regulatory regime for toxic materials must decide both the 
“volume of hazardous wastes” that will be produced and when (and how) to 
“dispose of the wastes.”288  Similarly, here, an ex ante regulatory regime for 
network intermediaries must decide both what intermediaries may learn 
about us and how long they may retain that knowledge.  This Part argues that 
such a framework solves, as a side effect, data breaches by both private 
parties and foreign governments—problems that on some accounts are even 
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more serious than surveillance.  In part for that reason, this framework may 
be more politically feasible than direct regulation of the government’s 
authority to command information and aid; at a minimum, it faces a different 
set of political challenges, such that it may prove to be a more realistic 
solution. 
1.  Regulating the Collection and Storage of Information 
Conceptually, for any information that is conceivably collected about 
people, the law must answer two related questions:  When is it legal to gather 
that information?  And once it is gathered, how long may it be retained?  
Under American law at present, the answer to those questions (with very 
minor exceptions) is that anything may be gathered by anyone and kept 
forever.  This Part argues that this response is implausibly extreme, and that 
our present laissez-faire approach is, in fact, the root cause of the surveillance 
problem this Article describes.  Rules about collection and retention should 
vary according to the type of data at issue and the intermediary that proposes 
to gather it. 
Before beginning this discussion in earnest, two notes on terminology.  
When I describe the collection of data, I mean data that is acquired by the 
network intermediary “in the clear”—that is, in a form that can be understood 
and used by the network intermediary itself.  This is in contrast to an 
intermediary that collects information only in an encrypted form, such that 
its contents remain accessible to the user, or others on the user’s demand, but 
not to the network intermediary itself.  In the latter circumstance, the network 
intermediary does not actually have access to information in a form that is of 
concern.  Moreover, when I speak of disposing of or destroying data, I am 
aware that depending on how that disposal is accomplished, forensic 
techniques may be available that can still recover it.289  My intent is to bracket 
that issue, and assume that to the extent law requires data to be disposed of, 
it is done in a manner that makes it nonrecoverable for practical purposes. 
The United States currently has no general regulatory framework for the 
gathering of personal information about users of networked services and 
devices.  There are no rules that “collectively address the acquisition, storage, 
transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business 
community.”290  Not even informal “standards” really exist to limit the 
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“collection and utilization of personal data in cyberspace.”291  The Wiretap 
Act specifically permits an “officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire 
or electronic communication service” to intercept and use communications 
of its users in the ordinary course of providing services.292  Moreover, as 
Patricia Bellia has observed, American law says “little” about data retention, 
and much of what it does say “provides incentives for indefinite data 
retention.”293 
There are a few scattered exceptions.  The rule implementing the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, for example, restricts the 
collection of photographs of children under thirteen.294  The Video Privacy 
Protection Act requires destruction of personally identifiable information “as 
soon as practicable, but no later than one year from the date the information 
is no longer necessary.”295  Similarly, the Cable Communications Policy Act 
of 1984 provides that cable operators “shall destroy personally identifiable 
information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for 
which it was collected.”296  But as Bellia observes, even these isolated and 
“sector-specific exceptions” are weak:  they require “destruction of data only 
when the data is no longer ‘necessary,’ and they leave the question of 
necessity entirely within the data collector’s discretion.”297 
As to some classes of data, the optimal solution might be to simply forbid 
intermediaries (or at least some intermediaries) from collecting it.  This might 
be especially appropriate for what Paul Ohm calls “sensitive information.”298  
The European Union’s Data Processing Directive, for example, has a 
distinctive set of rules for how information about “racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and . . . data concerning health or sex life” is collected.299  This 
sort of information is generally singled out for protection because of its 
unique ability to harm people when it falls into the wrong hands.300  At least 
under some circumstances, the government might be the wrong hands—a 
potential “adversary,” to use Ohm’s term.301  For example, in December 
2016, many engineers working at technology firms signed a pledge saying 
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that they would “refuse to participate in the creation of databases of 
identifying information for the United States government to target 
individuals based on race, religion, or national origin.”302  Those engineers 
also pledged to advocate within their organizations “to minimize the 
collection and retention of data that would facilitate ethnic or religious 
targeting[,] to scale back existing datasets with unnecessary racial, ethnic, 
and national origin data[, and] to responsibly destroy high-risk datasets and 
backups.”303  Gathering this sort of information, they feared, might facilitate 
impermissible targeting of vulnerable populations by a hostile government 
that came wielding the new writs of assistance.304 
The law should restrict the collection of less-sensitive information, like 
location data, to certain sorts of network service providers.  A mobile phone 
service must collect location information because the customer has to 
communicate with radio towers to use the service, and which ones the 
customer uses will necessarily reveal the user’s location.305  More simply, a 
service designed to offer driving directions has to know where you are for it 
to do its job.  But in other instances, location information is gathered simply 
to target advertisements,306 or sell it to someone else, as was the case with a 
third-party flashlight app that gathered users’ location information when 
used.307  While restricting the collection of semisensitive information still 
provides the government with some targets to collect it from, it would at least 
reduce the scale of the problem. 
The law must also provide an answer to how long information we give to 
intermediaries may be retained.  Other than “indefinitely,” there are two 
kinds of answers to that question, both of which might be appropriate for 
some types of data.  One answer is “until a user asks that it be removed.”  
Evocatively, this concept is sometimes called the “right to be forgotten.”308  
Such “rights” depend on user initiative:  that is, you’ve got to ask.309  There 
have been legitimate concerns raised about this “right” under American law, 
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especially to the extent it has been applied to limit the dissemination of public 
records.310  But the new writs of assistance suggest that at least a modest on-
demand disposal regime is necessary as a safety valve, in the event of 
expanded government surveillance authority.  When Congress or the courts 
make new information available to the government, they generally do so 
retroactively—that is, the government gets access to information that already 
exists, not just information that is created or collected after that moment.311  
Information must therefore be shared with network service providers without 
knowing, in advance, what the government’s ability to get it will be.  When 
the government acquires new authority to get information or assistance from 
network service providers, it should be possible to remove the information 
we have stored about us if that new authority changes the calculus of what 
we are willing to share.  Imagine being a member of a minority religion and 
witnessing the election of a hostile government in your home country.  
Imagine further that the new hostile government successfully persuaded the 
legislature or the courts to empower it to get assistance from social networks 
like Facebook in identifying members of your sect for what it claimed were 
“national security reasons.”  In this situation, you would want to have a right 
to insist that Facebook delete your religious affiliation from its records.  This 
right to insist that networks delete the information that might identify you 
would be consistent with what you would have shared in the first place had 
you known what was going to happen. 
The problem with on-demand disposal is that it replicates many of the 
market failures that prompt the need for regulation in the first place.  People 
do not always know who has collected information about them, especially 
when the collection has been done indirectly (by purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring it from the entities that directly observed and collected the 
information), and so people will not always know who to ask for deletion.  
Therefore, the law can and should require the automatic disposal of private 
information by network intermediaries in more circumstances than it does 
now by requiring the disposal of some information after a time certain, rather 
than upon user demand.  The justification for such a system is conceptually 
similar to the one for statutes of limitation and repose:  the peace that comes 
from knowing, after a certain period, that the events of the past will not come 
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to radically disturb your present circumstances.312  By analogy, a person 
should know that after a certain amount of time has passed, the government 
cannot drudge up certain types of old information about them.  Consider 
location information:  an automatic disposal rule for location information 
would permit a person to be sure after (say) ninety days that his or her visit 
to an abortion clinic, labor union hall, or temple would no longer be retained.  
However, automatic disposal cannot and should not be universal—
sometimes indefinite storage is precisely what we want, as is the case with 
many users wanting their emails or photos retained indefinitely in the cloud 
by their provider so they do not have to personally attend to backing them up 
locally.  In that circumstance, storing the information indefinitely but using 
a collection restriction, such as keeping the information in an encrypted 
format, is a superior solution. 
Decisions about the generation and disposal of information interact 
because, as Michael Froomkin has observed, the way in which the law 
regulates data retention will also affect incentives for data collection.313  To 
the extent that information is more useful or valuable when it can be retained 
for longer, permitting its indefinite retention will tend to encourage more 
collection at the front end.  By contrast, if information must generally be 
deleted after a short time or after certain conditions are met, thereby rendering 
it less valuable, less of it may be collected in the first place.  For this and 
other reasons, determining and implementing details of a framework like this 
one would no doubt be complex.  Whatever body is charged with doing so (a 
new expert agency, for example) would need to make determinations about 
what types of information were sensitive and should be regulated, what types 
of intermediaries should be permitted to collect what sort of information, and 
what time limits make sense for the retention of that which would be 
gathered.  While this Article does not propose to resolve every detail with 
this framework, if accepted, it would at least supply the right questions.  What 
should network intermediaries be able to learn about us?  Which 
intermediaries?  And for how long?  At the moment, we are not asking those 
questions at all—and so we are having the answers implicitly supplied by the 
commercial logic of businesses especially the advertising-technology 
industry.  It may be that our present regulatory vacuum on these questions is 
socially optimal, although I doubt it.  But even a conscious decision to leave 
things as they are would be superior to the present state of affairs. 
2.  Considerations of Political Economy 
One possible objection to the above might go:  If the government wants 
this information, what incentive would it have to adopt the sorts of 
regulations this Article describes?  If my descriptive claims about the 
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government’s likely motivations and behavior in Part II are correct, what 
chance does this proposal have?  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule call this 
problem the “inside/outside fallacy.”314  This problem occurs, they argue, 
when “the analyst is combining ideal with nonideal theory in an incoherent 
way, positing nonideal motivations for purposes of diagnosis and then 
positing idealized motivations for purposes of prescription.”315  In the 
welfare-economics literature, this is known as the “determinacy 
paradox”316—an analyst must account not only for “what solution a 
benevolent social planner would desire to institute,”317 but also for “who will 
have the incentives to supply that solution, given the analyst’s diagnosis of 
the problem.”318 
Upon closer examination, however, regulating network intermediaries 
actually enjoys certain advantages on this dimension over the “collect and 
resist” strategy described skeptically in Part II.  Whenever the first order 
cause of the harm is the government, proposals for reform typically must 
grapple with the inside/outside fallacy.  The usual way in which this is done 
is by positing the hypothetical presence of different motivations for the 
judiciary or legislatures than for the executive, and arguing for constraining 
the problematic behaviors via legislation or court action.319  That is internally 
coherent, but, as I argue in Part II, when it comes to this particular issue, 
judges and legislatures are typically part of the problem, and at any rate may 
be limited in their ability to practically constrain the executive.  So if the 
actors in the U.S. legal system as a whole are systemically favorable to 
government demands for information and aid, any workable solution must 
come with an explanation for how it can overcome that systemic 
characteristic, rather than simply wishing it did not exist.  Regulation of data 
collection and retention enjoys a few advantages along this dimension, at 
least when compared to attempts to regulate the government’s authority to 
demand assistance. 
First, treating surveillance as a harm created by the stockpiling of 
information and then proposing to regulate the stockpile mitigates other 
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harms created by that stockpiling.320  One of those harms is theft:  if network 
intermediaries stored less private information, they would be less likely to 
have it stolen, either by insiders or outside hackers.321  As Bruce Schneier 
observed, data theft is a serious problem:  “Every week, thieves break into 
networks and steal data about people, often tens of millions at a time.”322  
Such thefts can be used to commit identity fraud.323  The data may also be 
used to commit blackmail—consider the 2015 theft of identifying 
information from Ashley Madison, a website designed to help married people 
have affairs.324  Beyond private thefts, network intermediaries with large 
stockpiles of information are also an attractive target for foreign adversaries.  
In March 2016, John Podesta—then the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s 
presidential campaign—had his email compromised in a data breach that was 
linked to the Russian government.325  Those emails, going back years, were 
subsequently published during the waning days of a presidential election in 
ways that deeply troubled U.S. intelligence services.326  Regulations that 
would reduce these problems in addition to reducing the government’s own 
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capacity for surveillance might be politically viable in a way that a proposal 
that only reduced the government’s powers would not.327 
In addition, network service providers often operate in more than one 
jurisdiction and so are subject to regulation by multiple governments, some 
of which might have different views on surveillance policy, which might be 
able to change an intermediary’s behavior worldwide.  Facebook reports that 
it had over two billion monthly active users at the end of 2017,328 meaning 
not just the majority but the vast majority of its users were outside the United 
States.329  And the European Union’s new General Data Protection 
Regulation contains requirements consistent with much of what this Article 
suggests above,330 including on-demand deletion and limitations on data 
collection.331  The Regulation will require affected companies—everyone 
doing business in the EU—to update the user interface of their software to 
offer the required options to EU users, respond to personal data-export and 
data-deletion requests, develop audit and compliance reporting tools, and so 
on.332  Once that work is done, the costs of offering it to Americans is 
significantly decreased, and companies may find it impossible as a practical 
matter not to do so.  Facebook’s implementation of “hard delete on user 
accounts,” the ability of users to delete their account permanently, was 
similarly done to comply with EU rules.333  But because of Facebook’s 
internal data architecture, it was necessary to make the feature available to 
all users.334 
The major political economy downside to a proposed regulation on 
industry is the industry.  As noted above,335 there is a reason U.S. law treats 
this industry the way it does:  it is a major force in American politics, and 
distinctively so, because the major network intermediaries are American 
companies.  The same could be said of every industry that has ever been 
regulated,336 so this objection is not necessarily fatal.  But it is a drawback to 
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the framework worth taking seriously:  in addition to solving more problems, 
the proposal would also have more opponents, and perhaps not in a way that 
would provide a net advantage.  But to the extent one is skeptical about the 
feasibility of directly regulating the government’s powers to demand 
assistance, the mix of affected interests is at least different from what this 
Article proposes, which might make its viability a hypothesis worth 
disproving. 
CONCLUSION 
We tend to think of surveillance as a problem created by the government, 
and thus one to be solved by further regulation of the government itself.  This 
Article argues for a different view.  We are experiencing a surveillance 
problem that is, in fact, downstream from a more general problem:  too much 
data is being collected about us by private companies and retained for too 
long.  That enables too much surveillance, yes—but nothing about the 
government has changed.  The government wants to solve crimes, gather 
intelligence, and learn whatever it can in service of what it perceives to be its 
legitimate ends.  Our law is structured to accommodate that goal, and it is 
hard to imagine that it would not be.  What has changed is that there are now 
private entities that collectively aim to know every detail of our lives, from 
cradle to grave.  They have the technology to gather it, they have the space 
to store it, and they have built businesses on getting it. 
The general dynamic goes well beyond surveillance.  The rise of a new 
class of incredibly powerful firms that dominate an important sector of the 
modern economy, and the ways in which they interact with the government 
and the public sphere, raises difficult questions about the structure of society 
in the future.  For better or worse, we are used to Leviathan—our law and our 
norms have grown up understanding the awesome power of the state.  What 
we have not yet come to grips with is the new power of these network 
intermediaries and what we are to do about them.  The first step, this Article 
argues, is to decide what we will let them know and remember about us.  But 
that will not be the last. 
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